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This dissertation tries to contribute to the analysis of short run
monetary policy, assuming it is used to attain a target level of
income. To this effect the concept of Instrument-Indicators is
introduced, representing monetary variables that are used as the link
between the monetary sector and the income target, and that therefore
serve to define a specific type of short run monetary policy. Each
policy is defined according to a specific monetary variable that is
used as the instrument to attain the final target. The purpose then is
to analyze the effect of real and monetary sector shocks on income
under each of the different policies, since these shocks may limit the
ability of monetary policy to attain the desired income target. To do
this an initial theoretical framework is specified, and then a set of
VIII
different assumptions is introduced yielding a set of different
frameworks (models) under which our monetary policy analysis is
performed. These frameworks or models are of two types: aggregated
and disaggregated . For both types, the model's specification is
summarized in the respective IS and LM equations. However, the
monetary sector of the aggregated models does not disclose the elements
that determine money supply, while the disaggregated models are
characterized by a monetary sector that explicitely shows the sources
and uses of the monetary base. For the former type of models we
analyze the money supply and the interest rate policies, under economic
structures that have the following unique characteristics:interest
inelastic investment, interest elastic money supply, investment as a
function of real expected interest rate and wealth effect in
consumption. For the latter we study the security portfolio,
unborrowed reserves, monetary base and interest rate policies, under
economic structures that have the following salient features: interest
inelastic demand for money, iinterest elastic borrowings and excess
reserves functions and iinterest bearing demand deposits. Then for
each model, and each alternative monetary policy, the effect of each
type of shock on income is obtained in the respective reduced form
equation. The consequences for the monetary variables that are not
being used as instruments are also analyzed. The outcome of the
analysis leads us to conclude that the superiority of a specific type
of policy is determined not only by the type of instabilities or shocks
IX
that are more commonly present in the economy under study, but also by
its structural characteristics. Therefore, an accurate specification
of these characteristics is of greatest importance if monetary policy
is to be successful. Furthermore, the need to revise the "rules" that
have been established within a specific policy, as well as the
framework behind such rules, arises whenever economic behavior is
affected by current economic outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INSTRUMENT-INDICATORS OF MONETARY POLICY
1. Introduction
Monetary policy has always played a very important role in the
economic performance of the United States, even greater than fiscal
policy according to several studies dealing with the relative
importance of each one."' Because of this, monetary policy is a crucial
aspect of public policy, hence the relevance of research dealing with
the existing mechanisms that lead to decision making in and
implementation of monetary policy.
Within this context, the "indicator" problem deserves special
attention. Choosing the most appropriate indicator of monetary policy
has been the concern of many economists, as well as of the Federal
1. L. C. Andersen and J. Jordan, "Monetary and Fiscal Actions:
A Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization," in
Review. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Nov. 1968. See also Frank
De Leeuw and J. Kalchbrenner, "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of
Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization. Comment", in
Review. Fed. Res. Bank St. Louis, April 1969.
Reserve Board (hereinafter, FED) who, after having followed a strategy
in which the indicator of monetary policy was interest rate
performance, decided to start using unborrowed reserves as the
indicator since October 1979.^
These indicators are part of the short run operating procedures
by which the Fed has tried to attain monetary targets (i.e., money
supply targets). During the 19705, the targets were approached by
setting and managing short run interest rates; however, since 1979 the
Fed started using unborrowed reserves to this effect. In this sense,
both interest rates and unborrowed reserves have played the role of
instruments in the attainment of the monetary targets. Therefore,
short-run monetary policy has tried to control money (i.e., the Fed's
money strategy) by using and monitoring certain variables that can be
managed through open market operations. These variables have been
called "indicators" by some authors, and "instruments" by others.
However, both characteristics are necessary when dealing with short-run
policy management.
2. See Stephen H. Axilord and David E. Lindsey, "Federal
Reserve System Implementation of Monetary Policy: Analytical
Foundations of the New Approach", American Economic Review. Papers
and Proceedings. Vol. 71, No. 2, May 1981, pp. 2*16-252. See also:
Lawrence H. Meyer, ed., Improving Money Stock Control. Problems,
Solutions and Consequences. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1983.
2
3
The purpose of this chapter is to define these so called
"instruments" or "indicators" as part of monetary policy strategy, to
describe the properties that the chosen variables should have in order
to play their role as part of the overall policy procedure, to
distinguish them from "monetary targets", and to set the principles
under which alternative variables can be evaluated as candidates to
play the "instrument" and "indicator" role.
2. Definition of Instrument-Indicators
The indicator problem has been approached in two different
ways: first, as the problem of finding an indicator of monetary policy
actions (the taxonomical type, according to Saving ) and, second, as
the problem of finding an indicator of the effect of monetary policy
actions in economic activity, that is, in economic targets such as
output, employment, prices, etc.
4
Brunner and Meltzer define indicators as the "measures of the
direction in which monetary policy has changed in the recent past
5
and/or of the effect of monetary policy on employment". Saving
3. Thomas Saving, "Monetary Policy Targets and Indicators", in
Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 75, N0.4,.4, 1967, pp. 446-60.
4. Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, "The Nature of the Policy
Problem", in Targets and Indicators of Monetary Policy. Brunner and
Meltzer, eds., San Francisco Chandler Publishing Co, 1969, pp. 1-26.
4
perceives the indicator problem as that of "finding a variable or
combination of variables that will best describe the effect that
current monetary policy is having on economic activity". He further
argues that "the importance of the problem arises from the fact that
the choice of future policy is influenced by the policy maker’s
estimate of the effect of his current policy".
Therefore, we have, on the one hand, indicators as the
variables showing the directions followed by the FED in the recent past
and, on the other, indicators as signals about the effects of monetary
policy in the economy. In the context of evaluating different policy
alternatives and selecting the most appropriate course of action for
the future, the distinction is important because a situation may arise
in which the first indicator definition yields a different result from
the second one. For example, an expansive monetary policy (e.g., an
increase in unborrowed reserves) , may not have such expansionary
effect due to several factors or responses, that may or may not be
always present, and which are part of the trasmission mechanism of
monetary policy. It is clear that under such circumstances, what
monetary authorities ought to look for is an indicator that could show
if policy actions are having an expansionary effect on economic
activity , regardless of whether those actions were expansive or not.
5. Thomas Saving, op. cit. pp. 446-60.
5
Having a reliable indicator of the effects of policy actions on
economic activity is necessary because it permits the consideration and
evaluation of future policies; more important, it also implies the need
for a variable that can be observed as often as policy decisions are
made. Hence, the indicator problem is a short run problem: indicators
inform policy makers about the performance of the economic goal
variables that are their main concern, but are unobservable in the
short run.
As Saving states, " the variables in which we are ultimately
interested are observable with a considerable lag, so that by the time
we find out what the effect of our policy has been, considerable damage
may have been done. Hence, the choice of indicator does not imply that
useful information is being discarded but only that all the information
is not necessarily useful or available or both."^
Table 1-1 shows some of the properties that have been advanced
by several authors concerned with the indicator problem. These can be
classified as follows:
1. Controllability. As the Table indicates, some agree that it
is desirable to define indicators as variables that are easy
to control, which implies that they should be very sensitive
to policy actions and hence highly manageable through changes
6. Thomas Saving, op. cit., pp. 452-53.
Table 1-1. Desired Properties for Monetary Policy Indicators.
Sources:Thomas Saving (1967), Brunner and Meltzer (1967),
T0b1n(1969 and 1983), William Brainard (1969), Kamler and
Schwartz (1969), Hamburger (197 **). Richard Davls(l974),
Thomas Havrileskyfl977) and WilliamBarnett(l9Bl).
6
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7
in those actions (i.e., through open market operations, the
discount rate, reserve requirements, etc).
2. Effects on Economic Activity. A second property, shared by
most of the selected authors, refers to the role of indicators
in the context of the economic system: they must have a
definite influence in the variables that have been selected as
goal variables for the economy as a whole. Taking these two
properties together (i.e., "Controllability" and "Effects on
Economic Activity"), indicators come to play the role of the
instruments to attain the desired ultimate economic targets.
3. Endogeneity with respect to the rest of the economy. The
third property, which complements the first one and is
stressed by many authors, refers to the need of selecting
variables that are affected insignificantly (or not at all) by
policies or phenomena other than monetary policy actions. In
other words, we need variables whose endogeneity with respect
to the rest of the economy is minimum. This would reassure
the controllability of indicators and minimize the possibility
of changes that may be misleading , as signals of monetary
policy effects in the economy in the process of using such
indicators as the instruments to attain ultimate economic
goals.
8
However, this may not be the case, since, as Brunner
7
and Meltzer argue:
(Most of) the indicators of monetary policy usually
mentioned by economists... are endogenous
variables. As such, their position or rate of
change at any time is the result of the joint
interaction of the whole economic system and
reflects more than the effect of current monetary
policy. Fiscal policies and noncontrolled exogenous
variables also influence the endogenous indicators.
While it may be difficult to find a monetary variable that can
easily be affected by monetary policy actions and at the same
time be completely unaffected by other economic phenomena , we
can adopt a criterion in which the variables that are least
exposed to these additional effects (or forces) will be
considered best choices or , we may say, the variables that
can more precisely (certainly) be affected basically by
monetary policy actions, and that the interaction of monetary
policy and uncontrolled forces affecting those variables, will
render the best results in terms of the economic policy goals.
As Brunner and Meltzer recognize, "the relative size
of policy and non policy influences will differ with the
O
endogenous variable selected as indicator."
7. K. Brunner and A. Meltzer. "The Meaning of Monetary
Indicators", in Monetary Process and Policy: A Symposium.
G. Horwich, ed., Homewood, 111., 1967, p. 190.
9
4. Information Availability. Finally, since indicators would
represent a basis for future policy making, it would be
convenient to obtain information on them with a minimum amount
of delay. If ours is a short-run decision problem we need a
short period of delay between the occurrence of important
events and the information obtained.
5. Predictability Capacity. If we take all of the above
properties together, we can say that a suitable indicator
should be able to "predict" the effects of monetary policy in
the economy. This property is really concerned with the
second and third properties , we may say that it encloses
them. Not only must the instrument- indicator have an impact
on economic activity, but should also be able to predict such
a relationship in a systematic (certain) way. It is certain
that this ability will be affected by the third property.
Although we may find many variables that can indicate some of
the effects that monetary policy is having on economic
activity, our indicator definition should incorporate the
"instrumental" aspect which reduces the universe of variables
to be used. In other words, the selection should be made
among variables that can be used to attain the desired
8. Ibid., p.191.
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ultimate targets, which means that by observing their
performance the targets’ behavior can be monitored.
Finally, it is important to mention that due to the velocity of
the recent changes in the financial system (i.e., the diversification
of financial assets), there may be "possible" instruments or indicators
that do not show changes, (and hence do not signal economic activity
changes) under circumstances in which economic performance is being
affected by the varying composition of financial assets (which is part
of a monetary policy package). Therefore the ability of an indicator
to show such a compositional change effect will affect most of the
above properties, especially the predictability ability.
Therefore, we need to deal with instrument-indicators instead
of instruments or indicators as two separate and distinct concepts
since, as we have said, both properties are required in a variable to
be used as pivot for monetary policy. This discussion leads us here to
define an instrument- indicator (hereinafter I-I) as that monetary
variable that can be manipulated and through which ultimate targets can
also be controlled (this is the "instrumental" aspect), and that will
serve as a feed-back of information about ultimate targets (this is the
"indicator" aspect). In short, the properties that are required in an
instrument- indicator of monetary policy are: its controllability by
the monetary authorities(response to direct policy changes, both
quantitative and qualitative such as asset diversification) , the
11
possibility to predict its relationship with economic activity,
especially with the economic goal variables, in a systematic way (hence
the possibility to use it as pivot of monetary policy decisions), and
the feasibility to obtain information about its behavior with little or
no delay.
3. Difference Between Instrument-Indicators and Monetary Targets.
It is now necessary to distinguish between the concepts of
9
monetary indicator and monetary target. Thomas Saving emphasizes the
necessity of differentiating between a target and an indicator. He
states:
Essentially the policy maker requires a separation of the
change in his target variable into a policy effect and an
exogenous effect. Since observations of the changes in the
target variable yield only the total effect, some other
variable or combination of variables is required to reflect
the policy effect.
He then refers to such variable reflecting the policy effect as
the "monetary policy indicator". Taking into account this distinction
and the previous I-I definitions, we summarize the link between
monetary policy actions and economic activity in Figure 1-1.
9. Thomas Saving, op.cit., p. 450.
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Figure 1-1: Targets and Instrument-Indicators
in the Context of Monetary Policy
According to Figure 1-1, there is (or must be) a direct
relationship between monetary policy actions and I—I; hence, I-I must
be related to targets (i.e., "intermediate targets", as many authors
call them), and these must carry on the effects of monetary policy to
the macroeconomic milieu as reflected by the broad economic goals
(i.e., "final or ultimate targets").
Targets represent the link between monetary policy actions and
economic goals, although they are also affected by other factors and
policies. On the other hand, I-I are the variables that the monetary
authorities would easily (or at least, better) control, and that would
relate policy actions to targets such that we may be able to control
target performance by following the paths of I-I . However, if the
relationship between targets and I-I were unstable, the role of I-I as
"instruments" in the control of targets and would place serious
13
problems on overall policy procedure.
Thus, I-I should be managed (controlled) through monetary
policy actions directly, and should also be capable of affecting
targets in a determined (systematic) way:
If the intermediate target chosen is an endogenous variable
of the system (e.g., interest rates) as opposed to a policy
instrument (e.g., reserve base), the need for a distinct
policy indicator, a variable which will properly isolate
(indicate) the influence of current economic polialone on
the intermediate target variable, also arises....
Therefore, if I-I are closely related to intermediate targets and these
are also related to economic goals, we should be able to predict
economic performance by controlling of I-I (appealing to the
predictability capacity of I-I). Notice that both I-I and intermediate
targets are links between monetary policy actions and economic
performance, but I-I , by our definition, are controllable (i.e., not
affected by other factors) and also capable of affecting (controlling)
ultimate targets in a systematic way (i.e., are the instruments of
monetary policy). Figure 1-2 shows targets and I-I with the properties
that are derived from the above definitions.
10. Robert Holbrook and Harold Shapiro, "The Choice of Optimal
Intermediate Economic Targets”, in American Economic Review. Papers
and Proceedings. Vol. 60, No. 2, May 1970, p. 40.
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Figure 1-2. Targets and Indicators: Desired Properties
in the Context of Monetary Policy
The procedure described above corresponds to the so-called
"intermediate- target strategy", which decomposes the monetary policy
problem into two and where decisions are made separately at each of the
two levels: socioeconomic goals are set to define intermediate
targets; then, as intermediate targets have been established, I-I are
to be managed to attain such targets. Alternatively, I-I could be
viewed as the direct links between monetary policy actions and economic
activity, by putting aside the monetary targets as described above. In
such a case, intermediate targets would be omitted and the trasmission
links between I-I and economic targets would be the relevant ones for
policy effects. This would be an alternative to a two-stage or
intermediate- targetting procedure, as suggested by Ralph Bryant:
ll
An obvious alternative is to derive preferred time paths for
policy instruments from the best feasible paths of the
ultimate-target variables in a single-stage integrated
15
decision (for short, discretionary instrument adaptation)
rather than interposing a two-stage process that pivots on an
intermediate surrogate target.
In this case, monetary policy would be described by the upper
part of Figure 1-2 only, where the arrow goes directly from I-I to
Economic Goals. If we were better able to predict the values of the
economic goal variables from the performance of an instrument-indicator
as defined above, or from a set of them, than from the performance of
monetary targets which were supposed to be controlled by such I-I ,
then the one stage procedure should be preferred.
Different arguments have been raised both in favor of and
against an intermediate target approach, which is the one the Fed has
followed since 1970. Specifically, such has been a "money strategy"
since the money stock has been used as the intermediate target.
The advocates of the intermediate target (money) strategy base
their proposals on diverse arguments such as: the need to control
inflation by using a money target, the stability of the demand for
money function and its low interest-elasticity which assigns an
important role to monetary aggregates in controlling aggregate
expenditure, the existence of long and variable lags in the effects of
monetary policy and the existence of rational expectations. Advocates
11. Ralph C. Bryant, Controlling Money. The Federal Reserve
and its Critics. The Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., 1983, p. 83.
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also use arguments such as the view that such approach would use the
available information more efficiently ,and the possibility to isolate
1 2
monetary policy from the political process.
On the other hand, some objections have been raised such as the
impossibility of decomposing the economic system into two submodels
such that a higher level one (where social goals relate to intermediate
monetary targets) does not affect the lower level model (where monetary
targets are used to define the adequate path that I-I should follow).
It is also argued that focusing on intermediate targets may divert
attention from the ultimate economic targets (i.e., social goals), and
hence private agents may misperceive monetary policy. Finally, the
possibility that monetary and fiscal policy would become more difficult




Lastly, Davis points out the structural limitations that may
12. See discussion in Richard G. Davis, "Monetary Aggregates
and the Use of Intermediate Targets in Monetary Policy", in New
Monetary Control Procedures. Federal Reserve Staff Study, Vol. I,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington
D.C., 1981, pp. 13—22. See also: Benjamin Friedman. "The
Inefficiency of Short Run Monetary Targets for Monetary Policy", in
Brookings Papers of Economic Activity. Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C., No. 2, 1977, pp. 293“335.
13. See discussion in Ralph C. Bryant, op. cit., pp. 81—88.
14. Richard Davis, op. cit., pp. 38-42.
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exist on the settings of intermediate targets and that could restrict
the effectiveness of using such targets in combating inflation. For
example, problems might arise due to the short-run effects of monetary
policy on the real economy, before monetary policy has been able to
affect inflation in the expected way.
However, it seems to us that the problem of choosing the most
appropriate short-run operating guide has been mostly treated as a
problem of money control rather that as a problem of controlling the
1 5
ultimate target. This view, when implemented, might prove to have
dangerous effects if, with the purpose of keeping money supply in
target, other monetary variables are freed to move having undesirable
effects on ultimate targets.
The choice between an intermediate target and a single step
approach to monetary approach would depend, as we have said, on the
relationships that shape the underlying economic system and on the
15. See for example: Axilord and Lindsey, op. cit., pp.
246-52; Albert Burger. "Money Stock Control", in Controlling Monetary
Aggregates. The Implementation. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
1972, pp. 33~55;J0hn H. Ciccolo, "Is Short-Run Monetary Control
Feasible?", in Monetary Aggregates and Monetary Policy. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 1974, pp. 82-89; Richard Davis. "Short-Run
Targets for Open Market Operations." in Fed. Reserve Bank of New York,
1974, op. cit., pp. 40-59; J.M. Johannes and R. H. Rasche, "Can the
Reserve Approach to Monetary Control Really Work?", in Journal of Money
Credit and Banking. August 1981, pp. 298-313; and F. J. Levin,
"Examination of The Money Stock Approach of Burger, Kalish and
Bobb," Fed. Res. New York, op. cit., pp. 72-89;and Lawrence H. Meyer,
ed., Improving Money Stock Control. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, 1983*
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stability of such relationships (e.g., those between instruments and
final goal variables as opposed to those between intermediate targets
and final goal variables).
The Fed’s intermediate monetary target approach has been based
on the belief that:
The Federal Reserve can maintain a high (but by no means
perfect) degree of control over operating variables (our
"instrument- indicators). However, there is only a very
loose relationship between these operating variables and goal
variables. Given these circumstances
, policy makers can
find it useful to rely on intermediate target variables that
are more closely to economic goals than are the
operating targets.
However, some recent studies doubt the existence of certain and
stable relationships between intermediate targets and ultimate economic
17
goals. Higgins and Faust analyze the velocity behavior of monetary
aggregates (which measures the relation between GNP and the aggregate)
in the case of U.S., and conclude:
Recent erratic behavior of both Ml-B and M 2 has posed severe
problems for monetary policy implementation. Although
undoubtedly improving economic welfare by expanding the range
of assets available to the public, recent financial
innovations and changes in the legal and regulatory framework
have distorted traditional money demand relationships, even
16. Carl M. Gambs. "Federal Reserve Intermediate Targets:
Money or The Monetary Base," in Issues in Monetary Policy:II. Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, March 1983, p. 15.
17. Bryon Higgins and Jon Faust, "Velocity Behavior of the New
Monetary Aggregates", in Issues in Monetary Policy.ll. Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, 1982, pp. 51—65.
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for the redefined monetary aggregates. As a result, the
Federal Reserve’s ability to achieve ultimate policy
objectives by using monetary growth targets as policy guides
may be impaired for the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, after analyzing the experiences with money
growth targetting procedures in several industrial countries (Germany,
1 8
Switzerland, Canada and U.K), Karen H. Johnson concludes:
Regulatory change, financial innovation, and shifts of many
kinds all have the potential to distort the effects of a
given target for money growth from those expected and
intended. Foreign experience suggests that the ability to
respond flexibly to disturbances of these kinds is an
essential aspect of the implementation of targets for
monetary aggregates.
Therefore, we cannot have definite conclusions about the superiority of
a one-step or a two-step procedure until a specific economic structure
(i.e., hypotheses about economic behavior) is assumed, and the
corresponding relationships (i.e., between instrument-indicators and
ultimate goals vs. intermediate targets and ultimate goals) are
assessed empirically. However, the present study will be carried out
assuming a one-step procedure from instrument-indicators to ultimate
targets, under the economic structure that will be specified in Chapter
2.
18. Karen H. Johnson, "Foreign Experience with Targets for
Money Growth", in Federal Reserve Bulletin. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Washington D.C., Vol. 69, No. 10, Oct. 1983,
pp. 7^5-754.
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4.lmportance of the Underlying Economic Structure.
The properties that have been described as desirable, given the
role of I-I in the monetary policy process, are in fact trying to
answer a specific question to the policy maker: Could one operating
procedure, corresponding to a specific instrument-indicator, perform
better than another in taking the economy closer to the ultimate
targets, which is the ultimate goal of monetary policy? The answer to
this question, will depend upon the economic structure under
consideration, which will provide the possible outcomes of alternative
monetary policy procedures.
1 9
Thomas Havrilesky clearly states the importance of such a
structure:
The problem of choosing between alternative instruments is
essentially a problem of choosing between competing
hypotheses regarding the structure of the economy.
In the same way, several economists concerned with the
management of monetary policy have approached it with specific
objectives but basing their overall analyses on the belief that the
underlying economic structure is crucial in the evaluation of any
20
approach to monetary policy. Holbrook and Shapiro evaluate money
19. Thomas Havrilesky, "The Optimal Reaction Function:
Confluence of the Instrument Problem and the Intermediate Target
Problem", in Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 43, No. 3, Jan. 77, pp.
1288-1297.
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supply vs. interest rates as monetary policy targets within a standard
IS-LM constant price model, and conclude that different assumptions for
the functional relationships would result in different recommendations
as to the best variables to be used as targets. On the other hand,
shifts in the behavioral relationships, (i.e, changes in the autonomous
or stochastic part of the relationships) would also be significant in
choosing one target rather than another. The relative stability of the
commodity and monetary markets will determine which target would
perform best.
21
Keran stresses the importance of the structural framework
assumptions in determining the best measure of monetary influence. He
says that such measures would be determined by "the linkage between
monetary variables and the rest of the economy", which itself depends
"upon one’s assumptions about economic behavior". He quotes as
examples the Keynesian type of links which, if assumed, would lead to
conclude that interest rates would be the best measures of monetary
influences; on the other hand, if monetarist links are assumed, the
money stock would be chosen.
20. Robert Holbrook and Harold Shapiro, "The Choice of Optimal
Intermediate Economic Targets", in American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings. Vol. 60, No. 2, May 1970, pp. 40-46.
21. M. W. Keran, "Neutralization of the Money Stock-Comment",
in Review. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 1970, pp. 12-14.
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Richard Davis also analyzes the performance of interest
rates against money stock within an IS-LM framework, concluding that a
money supply target would work badly in an economy subject to widely
and unforeseen fluctuations in liquidity preference (i.e., money demand
shifts), while interest rates will perform inadequately in an economy
where the instability arises mainly from the nonfinancial sector (i.e.,
commodity market).
23
In an OECD study of U.S. Monetary Policy there is also a
reference to the instrument-indicator problem we are concerned with
here. In this context, the study states the disadvantages of choosing
as I-I variables that are endogenous, since they may give incorrect
information about monetary policy effects in the ultimate targets.
This assertion rests on an evaluation of alternative I-I according to
specific economic structures. The conclusion is that an interest rate
is a superior indicator when the typical source of uncertainities lies
in the demand for money, while the money stock is a better indicator if
the investment function is the main source of uncertainity.
22. Richard Davis, "Implementing Open Market Policy with
Monetary Aggregate Objectives", in Monetary Aggregates and Monetary
Policy. Fed. Reserve Bank New York, 1974, pp. 7-19.
23. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Monetary Policy in the United States. 1974.
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Therefore, we can conclude that, first, any evaluation of
alternative I-I and monetary procedures must depart from a set of
assumptions about the economic structure (i.e., theoretical framework).
Second, the usefulness of such an evaluation will depend upon the
closeness of the specified structure to the economic reality for which
policy recommendations are sought. Finally, the possibility that a
chosen policy procedure could affect the underlying economic structure
must be considered. This may well be the case when policy actions
create certain kind of expectations and uncertainities , reactions that
will themselves imply behavioral changes in the economic agents and
hence in the structure of economic relations.
If the structural framework is specified, the key factors and
relationships that determine the superiority of one monetary policy
procedure with respect to another will emerge; furthermore, if such
relationships could be assessed for a particular case economy, more
specific conclusions might be obtained. This confirms the economics
fact that there is no one solution for every case; there are at least
as many possible solutions to a problem as many variations we can make
to the general case.
After realizing the importance of the analytical framework in
order to have any analysis of monetary policy procedures, as is our
present concern, Chapter 2 is devoted to the specification of an
analytical framework and its possible variations , while Chapters 3 and




1. In this chapter we have tried to show the importance of
conciliating the concepts of instruments and indicators, which
traditionally are dealt with as two different ideas within the
analysis of short run monetary policy. We have defined I-I in
the context of short run monetary policy, as the tools to be
used in the process of attaining ultimate economic targets and
the signals of their performance.
2. We have also defined the properties that I-I must fulfill in
order to be useful in playing their role in the process of
short-run monetary policy implementation. These are the
following:
a. Controllability. This term is used instead of
"exogeneity" because the instrument-indicator should be at
least closely related (in a predictable way) to monetary
policy actions (e.g., open market operations), while it
need not be necessarily the variable which is under the
direct control of the authorities.
b. Impact on Economic Activity. This property is a crucial
one because it is embedded in the definition of the I-I
First of all, the definition of a Social Goal Function
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would establish a set of goals for economic variables
which are the ones to be considered in evaluating the
impacts of alternative variables to be used. Second, the
impact that any variable has on economic activity is
definite if we are to use it as an instrument and a sign
of economic activity performance. This impact may be
evaluated directly as the relationship between such
variable and the economic goal variables (single-stage
procedure), or in two steps (intermediate target
procedure). In the latter case we would need to evaluate:
i. Target Control. Following the distinction between I-I
and targets, and in view of the target role within the
trasmission mechanism of monetary policy according to
two-stage procedures, the evaluation of the
relationship between I-I and targets is necessary
since we expect it to be close and stable. This is
tantamount to evaluating the control procedure in
which monetary targets are pursued through monitoring
and management of the I-I .
ii. Economic Activity Results. This implies an evaluation
of the link between monetary (intermediate) targets
and economic activity.
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c. Endogeneity with respect to the rest of the economy. If
an indicator of monetary policy is subject to influences
which are not caused by monetary policy itself, it may not
be an efficient instrument in that it does not give
monetary authorities adequate information about policy
effects, which they require to decide on future monetary
policy actions. Such influences may distort the
information pertaining to monetary policy. Therefore I-I
must be affected little by phenomena other than monetary
policy. The endogeneity of any monetary variable as well
as its implications can only be assessed after a specific
economic structure is specified.
d. Information Availability. This property refers to the
easiness with which information about a variable is
obtained: we must be able to obtain information about
instrument-indicators with minimum delay.
e. Predictability Capacity.This refers to the indicator’s
ability of predicting the relevant economic variables
(i.e., those in the social goal function.) In other words,
are we acheiving our goals by keeping our I-I at the level
that is dictated by our economic structure?
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3. We have distinguished I-I from monetary targets and have
recognized the possibility of either a two-step or a one-step
short -run monetary policy strategy. In the first case,
intermediate monetary targets, which link I-I with final
targets, are established; in the latter case, these are not
necessary.
4. The choice between a two-step and a one-step procedures will
depend upon the structural characteristics of the economy
under study, because these will determine the relationships
between I-I and ultimate targets (i.e., types of trasmission
mechanisms).
5. The choice of the most appropriate instrument-indicator within
either a two-step or a one-step procedure will also depend
upon the economic structure assumed. Different hypotheses
about the economic structure may lead to different
conclusions. We could establish a set of assumptions to
conform a particular type of structure and get the respective
outcomes from it; then, this structure may be changed to
include or exclude specific cases and another set of
conclusions will be obtained.
We conclude, first of all, that a theoretical framework incorporating
the economic relationships that link the monetary sector with the rest
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of the economy must be specified. Chapter 2 will be devoted to this
task. An initial theoretical framework is specified and then a set of
new assumptions is introduced yielding a set of different frameworks
under which our monetary policy analysis will be performed. This will
allow us to capture the sensitivity of the monetary policy success to
the structural characteristics of the economy. Then, using such
frameworks, the effects of different shocks to the economy within
alternative policy procedures (i.e., using different
instrument-indicators), will be analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4. The
superiority of a particular procedure will be defined in terms of the
"Predictability capacity" of the corresponding I-I. This means the
attainment of the desired target with the use of such I-I. Such
predictability capacity may be sensitive to the economic structure
assumed and to the types of shocks under analysis. Therefore, we
expect to find important implications in this respect that may further
qualify the adequacy of a specific monetary policy procedure.
We must finally mention that, since our analysis will be
focused on the evaluation of instruments in the achievement of ultimate
targets(one-step procedure), when analyzing a particular monetary
policy procedure the respective I-I is assumed to fulfill the
"controllability” property (i.e., authorities can keep it at a desired
value). Although we will not try to evaluate this , we must note that
such assumption will be more realistic the more disaggregated the
instrument under consideration is, provided the instrument is a
29
monetary aggregate. The possibility of analyzing instruments with




This chapter will be devoted to the specification of the
theoretical framework to be used as a basis for analyzing the effects
of unpredicted economic changes (e.g., shocks, changes in behavioral
relationships, etc.), under different short run monetary procedures.
The first part of the chapter contains a review of studies that
have dealt, in one way or another, with the type of theoretical
analysis we propose to do. The purpose and the model that these
studies used, as well as their approach and results, will be described.
The second part of the chapter specifies the framework to be
used in the present study. First, the elements and equations that
determine aggregate demand (i.e., the real and monetary sectors), are
described. Next, the monetary sector is disaggregated in order to
capture the elements and mechanisms that determine money supply. This
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disaggregation of the monetary sector is necessary to determine the
sources of money supply that are closest to Open Market Operations
(hereinafter 0M0), and that are therefore susceptible to be considered
as instruments of short run monetary policy. Furthermore, this
disaggregation will enable us to better understand the monetary factors
that may either offset or contribute to the success of a chosen
instrument in achieving the targets for which it is intended.
I. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The first theoretical study that deals in depth with the
instrument-choice problem for monetary policy is due to Poole. His
purpose is to determine the conditions under which interest rates
should be used as instrument, and those under which the money stock is
preferable. He assumes that authorities use monetary policy to
stabilize income, and uses an IS-LM constant price model as the basis





where L = Loss
24. William Poole. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy in a
Simple Stochastic Macro Model", in Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Vol. 84, May 1970, pp. 197-216.
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Y = income
= full employment income
E = expected value operator
This loss function implies that income stabilization around full
employment is the goal of monetary policy. The income variable he
refers to is both nominal and real income, since he assumes a constant
price level.
He then distinguishes between a deterministic and a stochastic
model, and shows that in the former case the choice of instruments
makes no difference, since either instrument will render the same
solution. However, when stochastic disturbances are introduced into
the behavioral equations, income becomes a random variable ; hence, the
link between instruments and income is no longer perfectly known .
Poole simulates random changes (i.e., shocks) in the real sector, as
well as in the monetary sector and shows that if the real sector is
relatively less stable, the money stock is the instrument that will
minimize the loss function, while if the monetary sector shows less
stability, interest rates render superior results. He also shows that
the slopes of the IS and the LM affect the superiority of one
instrument over another.
Figure 2-1 summarizes some of Poole’s results as outlined
above. The first part (A) shows that if the monetary sector is




IS and LM instability given
an interest rate policy (r*), or




r = interest rate value if r is instrument
—*
M = money supply value if M is instrument
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will always be under an interest rate instrument; on the other hand,
if the instrument is the money stock, income will be fluctuating
between Y 1 and Y 3 and so will interest rates. Part B of the diagram
depicts the case when the real sector is the unstable one; we can see
that if the instrument used is the interest rate, income will be
fluctuating between Y 2 and Y4, while taking money supply as the
instrument will cause income to fluctuate between Y 1 and Y3, which
spans over a narrower range.
Poole then modifies the IS-LM model to introduce lagged effects
(in the real sector or IS equation), and studies the effect on the loss
function of following an "active" policy, relative to the effect of
25
pursuing a "passive" policy. In this case, after estimating the
expected loss under each alternative case, he concludes that such loss
is greater if a passive policy is followed.
In his conclusions, Poole stresses the fact that the instrument
problem arises due to uncertainity, which is an unavoidable component
of economic reality, and that thus the stochastic model is the adequate
one to use. He also states that, although his analysis was based in
the simplest model (since his goal was to show the importance and
nature of the problem), it opens the way to perform the analysis in
25. An active policy is defined as one that is adjusted period
by period. The passive policy consists of setting a steady rate of
growth of money or fixing interest rates, regardless of current
economic conditions. See Poole, op. cit., p. 210.
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more complex models. Finally, he comments on the uncertainity of the
value of the model’s parameters, something he did not consider in his
analysis, but that could be the subject of further research on the
topic.
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Richard Davis has also dealt with the instrument-choice
problem in a study whose objectives are the following:
i) To consider and compare alternative variables to use as
instruments of short-run monetary policy, taking into account the
ability to control them through open market operations.
ii) To study the relationships of longer-term monetary targets
and such instruments, in order to determine the degree of manageability
of the targets by using a specific instrument.
In order to analyze the controllability of instruments, he
decomposes each one to determine if it includes uncontrollable elements
(from the authorities’ point of view) that must be offset by OMO when
27
the instrument is to be kept at a pre-established level. He
26. Richard Davis, "Short-run Targets for Open Market
Operations," in Monetary Aggregates and Monetary Policy. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 1974, pp. 40-59.
27. The potential instruments selected for analysis are
variables within the transmission mechanism between OMO and the money
stock (including the latter); that is, those variables that are
monetary base sources, or the monetary base itself, or the money
supply.
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concludes that nonborrowed reserves and the nonborrowed base (adjusted
for reserves required behind treasury deposits and free reserves), are
the best choices as weekly monetary targets (instruments). His
analysis also indicates that another group of instruments, including
borrowings, total (adjusted) reserves, and the monetary base (also
adjusted), could be used if the authorities had some knowledge of
interest rate elasticities of the demand for excess reserves and
borrowings.
The second part of his paper studies the relationship between
instruments and targets, where the targets are also monetary variables.
Davis suggests a policy procedure in which target values are specified
on a monthly basis, from which the corresponding week-to-week values
for the instruments will be specified.
Such procedure could be quantified by regressing the monthly
values of the target in terms of the monthly average values of the
instrument (weekly operational target) under analysis, of other lagged
variables, and of seasonal dummies considered appropriate. He carries
out this type of analysis using unborrowed reserves as the desired
weekly instrument, and takes different monetary variables as the
potential monthly targets. He then regresses the potential monthly
targets as functions of the percentage change of unborrowed reserves,
lagged unborrowed reserves, total reserves changes and some dummies.
Finally, he does the same analysis using quarterly data. After
analyzing the equations, he concludes that "there is no existing
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evidence to demonstrate the possibility of tight control over monetary
and credit growth rates-even over quarterly average
periods . . . Nevertheless, existing evidence does give reasonable
grounds for hope that such control could in fact be possible over
quarterly periods if midquarter corrections and the use of judgement
28
can be brought in to substantial advantage." Such conclusions, of
course, are based on the lack of acceptable statistical results of the
regression coefficients relating monthly targets and the instrument.
In the final section of his paper, Davis talks about the
implications of having quantity (monetary) targets for the stability of
the money market (i.e., interest rate behavior). The effects of a
demand shift, given a quantity target, will be a change in money market
conditions. Similarly, the effects of a demand shift, given an
interest rate target, will be the accommodation of monetary aggregates.
In his conclusions he argues that
"Experience (in the U.S.) seems to indicate that the system
can exert a very high degree of control over money market
conditions if it chooses to disregard quantity
considerations. By contrast, there is no experience to show
what degree of control over monetary aggregates might be
possible if such control were to be pursued exclusively and
without regard to the effects on the money market.
Similarly, there is no experience to show wh|t the cost in
terms of money market instability might be."
y
28. Richard Davis, op. cit., p. 49.
29. Richard Davis, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
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However, Davis’s study suggests that the adoption of explicit
quantity targets would cause tolerable fluctuations in money market
conditions if a "mixed strategy" is followed. He also states that a
policy to control the growth rate of an aggregate will still leave the
month-to-month behavior of such aggregate subject to random shocks
(noises), but that the control over longer periods of time (e.g.,
quarters) can be improved. As a summary of the role played by either
quantities or interest rates as instruments he concludes:
"If you wish to stabilize the price of any good, the amount
you supply will reflect fluctuations in the demand schedule
for the good; conversely, if you wish to stabilize the amount
you supply, you must allow fluctuations in demand to be
reflected in price fluctuations."^
32
Le Roy and Lindsey explore the results obtained by Poole,
which they justify mathematically in their appendix. They specify a
simple static linear IS-LM structure, with independent, normally
distributed errors and known coefficients, and analyze the superiority
30. A "mixed strategy" refers to one in which both monetary
aggregates and money market conditions play a role. That is, even if
policy is defined so as to use a specific instrument (e.g., aggregate
versus interest rate), the alternative instrument is not abandoned
completely, but its behavior is used as a basis to decide whether to
change the main instrument's value.
31. R. Davis, op. cit. p., 50.
32. Stephen F. Le Roy and David E. Lindsey, "Determining the
Monetary Instrument: A Diagramatic Exposition", in American Economic
Review, Dec. 1978, pp. 929-93^.
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of a money stock to an interest rate instrument if the objective were
to minimize deviations of income from a target level (i.e., to minimize
the loss function, equal to the variance of the error in the reduced
form for income).
They simulate an unstable LM (and stable IS) situation as well
as one in which it is the IS which is the unstable (while the LM
remains stable). Their results are consistent with Poole’s. 33 In the
former case, the LM curve is responsible for interest rate changes and
it is therefore preferable to use the interest rate as the policy
instrument. In the latter, using the money stock as the instrument
will render a smaller deviation of income from the target level.
They then simulate the case in which both IS and LM shift
together (i.e., IS upwards and LM leftwards), and show that a money
stock policy would result in too high an interest rate and a too low
income level (relative to target levels), and that keeping an interest
rate policy would cause both money and income to be too high. Under
these circumstances they favor a combination policy in which,
"The interest rate and money stock are maintained in the
particular linear combination which minimizes the expected
1055."
34
33. Poole, op. cit., 1970.
34. Le Roy and Lindsey, op. cit., p. 932.
Further simulation of IS and LM shifting together leads the
authors to conclude that if the error variances of both curves were the
same, a pure money stock policy would be preferred to a pure interest
rate policy, regardless of the values of the slopes of the equations.
They further state that if both, variances and slopes, were equal the
optimum combination policy would coincide with a pure money stock
policy.
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Axilord and specify an analytical framework to
analyze the operating procedures used in the United States before and
after 1979. In other words, they study the reserve approach, used
after 1979, in which unborrowed reserves are used as the instrument,
and the federal funds rate approach, that uses such rate as the
instrument. Their analysis incorporates the Fed’s objective to attain
a money supply target. The analytical framework implicit in their
analysis is a stochastic model of the demand for and the supply of
money, where the former depends upon income, prices and interest rates,
whereas the latter is a function of unborrowed reserves and interest
rates.
35. Stephen H. Axilord and David E. Lindsey. "Federal Reserve
System Implementation of Monetary Policy: Analytical Foundations of
the New Approach," in American Economic Review. Papers and
Proceedings. Vol. 71, No. 2, May 1981, pp. 246-252.
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Their analysis points out that within the reserve approach,
either money supply or money demand shocks (i.e., shifts) would cause
money supply and interest rates to change; however, the change in the
interest rate will partially offset the effect in the money supply.
The final result (deviation of money from target) would depend upon the
interest elasticities of the supply and demand functions.
Within the federal funds rate approach, nonborrowed reserves
would change to compensate demand shifts in order to keep the rate at
the pre-assigned level, the money stock being therefore
demand-determined. However, if there are money supply shifts, as
unborrowed reserves are used to keep the pre-set interest rate, the
money stock will return to its desired level. These results are shown
in the diagrams of Figure 2-2, which show the results implied by the
authors’ analysis. Part A assumes an interest rate target. If there
is a shift in the demand for money (to MD’), the money stock will
become M, , since unborrowed reserves are increased in order to keep
the interest rate at r*. Equilibrium first moves from point A to B and
finally to C. On the other hand, if the money supply shifts to MS’
autonomously, the interest rates will fall and unborrowed reserves are
decreased in the process of restoring r*; hence M* is achieved. In
this case, as Part A of Figure 2-2 shows, equilibrium moves from point
A to A’ and then back to A. Part B assumes an unborrowed reserves
instrument (set at UR*). If there is a demand shift to MD', interest
rates rise and so does the money supply, to r 1 and Mlb respectively
42
Figure 2-2
Effects of Money demand
and Money Supply shifts
on the Monetary Sector,
under either an interest
rate or an unborrowed
reserves policy.
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(notice that Mlb is closer to M* than Mla). Equilibrium in this case
shifts from A to B. Also, a money supply shift such as to MS' will
cause interest rates to fall and the money stock to increase, to Mlb
and r 2 respectively, equilibrium moving from A to C.
Q £
Sellon and Teigen-5 have also graphically formalized the
analysis of short run monetary policy instruments, with the purpose of
finding the circumstances under which interest rates are superior to
reserve aggregates.
They focus on the U.S. case and so define (short-run) operating
targets, intermediate targets and policy goals. Therefore, the choice
problem has two dimensions: one is the instrument-choice problem, and
the other is the intermediate target-choice problem.
The framework they use is consistent with Poole's previous
work, one important difference being that they allow both, prices and
income, to change and thus focus their analysis on aggregate demand and
supply schedules rather than in IS-LM curves. This also enabled them
to analyze supply-side disturbances in the context of instrument
choice, which previous studies did not do. They simulate the different
disturbances in a diagramatic analysis and consider both choice
problems on each simulation. Their results are consistent with
36. Sellon and Teigen, "The Choice of Short-Run Targets for
Monetary Policy. Part I: A Theoretical Analysis," in Issues in
Monetary Policy 11. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, March 1982,
pp. 27-40.
previous studies. However, their analysis of supply side shock shows
that in this case, the choice problem depends on the authorities'
preference with respect to stabilizing inflation or real output. In
the former case, a reserve aggregate is preferred as instrument,
because if interest rates were chosen inflation would worsen. On the
other hand, interest rates are the superior instrument in the latter
case, since under such policy output tends to be restored.
Table 2-1 reproduces the authors' summary of their results for
each type of disturbance.
37
Roper and Turnovsky use an IS-LM stochastic model to take a
closer look at the instrument-choice problem for income stabilization.
However, they differ from previous studies in that they view the
problem as that of selecting the most appropriate definition of the
variable (monetary aggregate) to be used as the instrument. They
define the aggregate as a weighted average of the monetary base plus
government debt. The optimization procedure consists of finding the
weights (of the monetary base and the government debt) that minimize
income variance, subject to the IS-LM structure. Such IS-LM embodies
the monetary aggregate definition and the government budget constraint.
The optimization procedure yields the appropriate weights that the
37. Don E. Roper and Stephen J. Turnovsky, "The Optimum
Monetary Aggregate for Stabilization," in Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 95, Sept. 1980, No. 2, pp. 331—356.
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Table 2-1. Sellon and Teigen's Results: Choice of Short-Run
Targets under Different Disturbances
Source: Sellon and Teigen, "The Choice of Short Run Targets for
Monetary Policy. Part I: A Theoretical Analysis", in Issues in Monetar
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optimal monetary aggregate should have under different disturbance
assumptions, (i.e., it yields the optimal value of the weights, in
terms of the variances of the disturbances of each market). The
authors analyze special cases, such as that in which the disturbance in
the goods market is zero. In this case, the solution is the same as in
previous studies, namely that the optimal policy is to stabilize
government debt, which is equivalent to stabilizing interest rates.
Within their model and its assumptions, the authors conclude that
introducing government debt as part of the monetary aggregate improves
the possibility of stabilizing income. The only exception is the
presence of an interest inelastic demand for money together with no
disturbance in the demand for deposits (i.e., vertical LM), in which
case the optimal aggregate equals deposits only, since the optimum
solution renders a weight equal to zero for government debt. This
result is expected under a situation in which the LM has become the
sole determinant of income, such as an infinitely inelastic LM , and
where the objective is to minimize income variance.
Ralph C. analyzes alternative short-run operating
strategies using a theoretical model for the money market. His
framework is based on the balance sheet of the U.S. monetary
38. Ralph C. Bryant, Controlling Money. The Federal Reserve
and its Critics. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1983,
Chapters 2 and 3, PP* 3~33.
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authorities and includes the different elements that participate in
determining the money supply.
He defines the alternative short-run procedures, each one
corresponding to a particular instrument, as "policy regimes", and his
analysis covers five different regimes: portfolio (government
securities), base (monetary base), total reserves, unborrowed reserves,
and funds rate. He then analyzes the effects of different types of
disturbances, for each particular regime, within a policy procedure
that intends to control the money stock (i.e., to achieve and hold a
money supply target). That is, he evaluates the effects of a
disturbance on money stock changes. He simulates disturbances
occurring in the supply side of the money market, the demand side, and
the real sector. Bryant concludes that the funds rate regime is the
most appropriate for situations in which disturbances come from the
supply side of the money market and also for disturbances on the demand
side that are due to changes in assets’ preferences. However, the
funds rate regime proves inferior when he simulates aggregate demand
disturbances originating in the economy's real sector, in which case
the total reserves regime performs best. In his conclusions about the
choice between interest rate vis-&-vis a monetary aggregate as
instrument, he argues that, "the key point, however, is that neither a
price-stabilization nor a quantity stabilization presumption is the
appropriate guideline for monetary policy in all circumstances."
48
Although his analysis only covers each disturbance case
separately, he stresses the importance of realizing that in real life
such shocks may occur simultaneously, giving the monetary authorities a
very hard and uncertain environment to work in. Table 2-2 summarizes
his results for each type of regime he considered.
Bryant's approach is based on the current structure of U.S.
monetary policy, namely that a money stock target is specified as a
link between instruments and ultimate targets. However, he does not
believe that such a two-stage procedure (i.e., intermediate targetting
procedure) is the most adequate if what authorities desire is to attain
ultimate targets.
Finally, although he does not study international issues in the
book we are referring to, he talks about their importance in the
context of monetary policy. He contends that monetary interdependence
between countries is a factor that makes monetary policy more difficult
and its results more uncertain.
40
Tobin has also emphasized the importance of economic shocks
in the context of monetary policy procedures, stressing the fact that
the optimum short run strategy (i.e., the instrumental choice), will
39. Ralph Bryant, op. cit., p. 110.
MO. James Tobin, "Monetary Policy: Rules, Targets and
Shocks", in Journal of Money Credit and Banking, vol. 15, No. 4, Nov.
1983, pp. 506-518.
Table 2-2. R. Bryant’s Results: Performance of Alternative Operating
Regimes in Directing Non-Policy Disturbances to Least Troublesome
Destinations
NOTE: For a particular non-policy disturbance identified in a row of
the table, each regime is ranked relative to the others.
A indicates the preferred regime for that disturbance, due to least
troublesome consequences for Fed’s objectives.
B, C, D indicate respectively the second, third, and fourth best
regimes.
F indicates the regime under which the disturbance has the most
troublesom effects.
Table should be read horizontally, one row at a time.
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B D F C A
currency demand D F A A A
External to
financial markets C B A D F
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depend "on your model of the financial and economic system, and on your
objective and priorities".
He further argues that monetary policy should not only be
concerned with nominal objectives since it also affects real variables
such as the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, savings,
41
investment, etc. Monetary policy affects inflation, and inflationary
expectations, which in turn affect real rates of return in currency and
other assets with fixed nominal interest rate, and thus, the whole
structure of asset prices and returns. In other words, he argues that
"monetary authorities should not, indeed cannot, escape responsibility
42
for real macroeconomic outcomes".
Therefore, Tobin's position is that monetary policy must be
concerned with both nominal and real macroeconomic variables. On the
other hand, he reviews Poole's analysis of economic shocks and the
convinience of pegging money versus interest rates, as well as a
possible money supply-interest rate rule, as a form of combination
policy. In this context, he argues that the LM curve has become
steeper in the U.S. case as a result of monetary reforms (e.g., the
deregulation of interest rates) and also due to the recent monetarist
policy of focusing in money supply targets. According to him, such
41. Ibid., p.509.
42. Ibid, p. 511.
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monetarist policy was established assuming a stable demand for money
function, and the relative low probability of financial shocks as
compared to real shocks; however, he admits that recent evidence denies
the validity of such propositions.
Tobin stresses that the prescriptions arising from a new
framework enclosing a volatile demand for money (financial shocks) as
well as a steeper LM (due to monetary reforms) will be quite different
from prescriptions that arise amidst optimum circumstances in which
financial shocks would be greatly limited and the money market highly
regulated.
He then analyzes the cases when price shocks occur in the
supply side of the economy (i.e., aggregate supply shifts), as well as
when there are expected inflation shocks (that cause a downward shift
in the demand for money for given real interest rates). In the first
case, the shock causes a fall in output and a price rise, which make
Tobin conclude that if the authorities’ main concern is inflation, a
monetarist policy should be followed (i.e., fixing the money supply at
a pre-established level), while if their main concern is to attain full
employment income, an accommodative monetary policy (i.e., pegging
interest rates) should be pursued (since real money supply fell, money
supply must be increased). In the latter case, the effect of the shock
is expansionary since the demand for money falls, in which case Tobin’s
analysis suggests that monetary policy be accommodative (i.e., pegging




Interpretation of Tobin’s Analysis
NOTES:
AD = aggregate demand
AS = aggregate supply
A£* = aggregate supply after shock
r* = interest rate value when interest rate policy
M = monetary supply value when monetary supply policy.
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money supply when money demand has increased and reducing money supply
when demand fell. Figures 2-3 and 2-4 try to give a diagrammatic
interpretation of Tobin's analysis of these shocks.
Figure 2-3 simulates the aggregate supply shock. If money
supply is the instrument, equilibrium moves from A to B, in both
diagrams I and 11. Prices rise from P to P
D
and income falls. On the
other hand, if the instrument is the interest rate, equilibrium moves
from A to C in diagram I (since aggregate demand shifts with the
accommodative monetary policy), and then from A to B and back to A in
diagram 11. Prices rise to P f but income is restored to its original
level. Hence, this figure shows that under an aggregate supply shock,
using a money supply instrument will bring price stabilization, while
an interest rate instrument will restore output.
Figure 2-4 simulates an expected-inflation shock: under a
money supply instrument, equilibrium moves from A to A* (expected
inflation shock through the demand for money), and then to B (due to
price rise), but under an interest rate instrument it shifts from A to
B( as in the initial case) and back to A (due to the accommodative
monetary policy).
It is clear from this diagramatic analysis that under such type
of shock, an interest rate instrument would be more appropriate,
regardless of whether the ultimate policy goal is to control inflation
or the attainment of full employment income. Later in his paper, Tobin
mentions the need to seek variables that would indicate or predict
Figure 2-4
Expected-Inflation Shock:
Interpretation of Tobin's Results
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types of shocks affecting the economy. He ends his discussion
suggesting a multistage procedure for monetary policy implementation,
within which instruments will play an important role. Such procedure
is described in Table 2-3.
Table 2-4 summarizes the different studies described above,
classifying them uniformly according to their main focus, the
theoretical model used and the type of analysis (cases) considered.
From such summary we can see that the instrument choice problem
has been dealt with in two ways from the point of view of the objective
function. The first one uses income as a target for stabilization
purposes and hence analyzes the relationship from instruments to income
directly. The second assumes a two stage procedure where, although
income stabilization is the final target, it is an intermediate
monetary target which serves as the focus for choosing the most
appropriate instrument.
The studies also vary with respect to the analytical frameowrk
used. However, the definition of such framework is closely linked to
the scope and objectives of the study itself. When the relationship
under analysis is the instrument-money supply target, a money market
model is chosen. On the other hand, if the relevant relationship is
that from instrument to income (assuming constant prices), the goods
market must be added and hence we have an IS-LM model as the basis for
analysis. Finally, if flexible prices are to be allowed or if price
shocks are to be analyzed, then aggregate supply considerations must be
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Table 2-3. Tobin’s Multistage Procedure for Monetary Policy
Source: J. Tobin, "Monetary Policy: Rules, Targets, and Shocks", in
Journal of Money Credit, and Banking. V01.15, N0.4, Nov. 1983, pp.
516-17.
Ultimate
Target: (nominal GNP growth)
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included, leading the study into a complete aggregate demand-aggregate
supply model.
From the discussion above we conclude that the theoretical
framework must be specified according to the objective functions (e.g.,
stabilization of income or money supply), and to the types of
simulations that will be performed (i.e., shocks).
For the present study, instruments have already been defined
(cf. Chapter 1) as the tools that will be used to attain ultimate
objectives. Therefore, income stabilization has been chosen as the
objective since it is the macro variable that signals the overall
stability performance of the economy, and it will usually be part of
43
any macroeconomic policy package.
The model on which our analysis will be based is described
next. As will be evident below, the initial assumptions will be
modified later in several ways so as to generate a set of different
theoretical structures under which the analysis will be performed.
This will enable us to capture the sensitivity of the results to
different model specifications. This type of analysis could shed some
light into the instrument choice problem within a context of uncertain
structural parameters as well as uncertain models of economic behavior,
which can be interpreted as shocks to the structure assumed(i.e.,
43. I will follow Poole's methodology of keeping prices
constant so that nominal and real income are equal.
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economic model).
Table 2-5 describes the scope of our analysis, in the same
fashion that previous studies on the subject were described in Table
2-4 above.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Having in mind the objective of using monetary policy for
income stabilization purposes, a framework of income determination
comprising the monetary and the real sectors of the economy will be
proposed. This will enable us to determine the monetary sector's role
in the process of income determination and its sensitivity to outside
factors, and to introduce the monetary policy procedures that are our
main concern.
A. Description of Real and Monetary Sectors.
Starting from an equilibrium position, that is, a situation
where both the monetary and the real sectors clear, the distortion
caused by different disturbances or behavioral changes (that is, the
comparative statics analysis), can be found . Therefore, the model
will be specified for an equilibrium situation.
Using the simplest, closed-economy fixed-price IS-LM framework,
the main relationships that compose and link the monetary and the real
sectors will be depicted. Several assumptions will later be modified
such that the analysis can be performed under different scenarios and
capture the sensitivity of the results to several model specifications
(i.e., different models of economic behavior).
Table 2-6. Real Sector Relationships
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c * f(Y) + U
c
I = g(r) + Basic Relationships
G = G
0
Y = C + I + G





G = government expenditure
r = interest rate
G
q
= exogenous level of G
U ,U, = disturbance terms
c i
A = s[G + U + U.]
0 C 1
s = income multiplier of + f fy y
f' (Y) >0, g»(r) < 0, h’(r) < 0
NOTE: linear functions assumed.
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We now proceed to define the real sector's elements and
relationships: investment is an inverse function of interest rates;
consumption is a direct function of income, and government expenditures
are assumed exogenous. Hence, given that in equilibrium consumption
(C), plus Investment (I) plus government expenditures (G) equal
National Income (Y), the IS curve (reflecting the real sector's
equilibrium) relates income and interest rates (r) inversely. It is
also assumed that the behavioral relationships, investment and
consumption are stochastic; that is, are affected by a disturbance
term. (See Table 2-6). On the other hand, equilibrium in the monetary
sector is such that money supply equals money demand. Although this
sector will later be disaggregated and some assumptions will be
changed, it is now described in a general form to place it in the
context of income determination. The demand for money (i.e., demand
for real balances) is assumed to be a direct function of income, (i.e.,
transaction balances) and an inverse function of interest rates (i.e.,
portfolio choice theory), and is also affected by a disturbance term.
The money supply is assumed exogenous for the time being, an assumption
that will be dropped when analyzing the monetary sector alone. Hence,
we obtain the monetary sector's equilibrium as demand and supply are
equated, yielding a positive relationship between income and interest
rates, for a given level of money supply (i.e., an LM curve that
contains the pairs of income and interest rates values that maintain
the monetary sector in equilibrium). (See Table 2-7).
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j'(Y) > 0, k'(r) < 0, 1*(r) > 0
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If we were to assume that the money supply is a (positive)
function of interest rates, we would still have the positive
relationship between income and rates depicted by the LM curve above,
A Y
although the value of such relationship would be larger (i.e., ----- in
the LM equation). The larger arises because as interest rates
rise, they lower the demand for money but also increase the supply.
Hence, the discrepancy between money supply and money demand is greater
than in the case where money supply does not respond to interest rates;
therefore, for the monetary sector to clear , the new (greater)
equilibrium income level needs to be greater than that necessary to
clear the market when the only effect of interest rates is on the
demand for money (See Figure 2-5).
B. Aggregate Demand Relationship
Having determined the real sector's (IS) as well as the
monetary sector's (LM) equilibrium loci, the demand side equilibrium
for the economy will be determined by the level of income and interest
rates that maintain both markets in equilibrium, that is, where the IS
and LM intersect.
As long as we continue assuming fixed prices, it is enough to
pursue the analysis within the above IS-LM context, evaluating the
economic shocks according to their effect on the level of income that
constitutes IS-LM equilibrium. However, as soon as we relax the fixed
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Figure 2-5
The Monetary Sector Equilibrium
Relationship under Interest-Elastic and
Interest- Inelastic Money Supply.
Where; = Money supply interest-inelastic assumed.
= Money supply interest-elastic assumed.
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price assumption, we need to work with the aggregate demand
relationship, together with aggregate supply to obtain the resulting
levels of income and prices under each of the cases analyzed.
Furthermore, the aggregate supply-aggregate demand framework will be
necessary if we also wish to analyze the effects of supply shocks on
the economy, under different policy procedures.
Hence, from the IS-LM equilibrium we can obtain the aggregate
demand curve which relates income and prices by allowing prices to vary
and obtaining their effect on the IS-LM equilibrium level of income.
To do this, we need to specify the variables in real terms dividing
them by the price level. The resulting model is presented in Table
2-8.
As prices increase, the supply of real balances decreases and
the demand for real balances thus exceeds supply. In order to obtain
additional balances (on the demand side), the public will sell bonds
(or any kind of interest-bearing assets) and cause interest rates to go
up. Therefore, for any given level of income, equilibrium in the money
market will require higher interest rates, such that the demand for
real balances falls and equals supply (i.e., there has been a leftward
shift in the LM curve). Figure 2-6 shows the LM shift due to the price
increase, and the initial effect on the monetary sector as interest
rates rise: from equilibrium A to point Bon new LM. On the real
sector's side, higher rates mean lower investment, so income will start
Table 2-8. Determination of Aggregate Demand
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Real C = f(Y) + U
o
Sector I = g(Y) + U.









where: C, I, Y, G, Md, MS are in real terms
MS
q
= nominal supply of money
P = price level
IS: Y=h(r)+s(G +Uc+Ui)
°MS






Y = C + d(P)+U
where C = c(g,MS)
d(P)=F(l’(r),h’(r),j'(Y))
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to fall as investment is lower than savings at any interest rate above
; hence, production falls (implying a movement along the IS from
point A to C). On the monetary sector, as income falls the demand for
real balances does so, too, relaxing the pressure on interest rates and
hence letting them fall (movement along new LM from point B to C).
Such forces in both markets will continue until new equilibrium C is
reached. Therefore, the new equilibrium is given along the same IS
curve but intersecting with a new LM curve, to the left of the original
one. The result is an inverse relationship between income and prices
as shown in Diagram II of Figure 2-6. Then, the aggregate demand
relationship will be of the form:




where l*(r) and h’(r) are the LM and IS slopes (i.e., respectively).
or
From this aggregate demand equation it can be seen that changes
in exogenous variables or disturbance terms from either sector will
shift aggregate demand for any price level. Such a change will press
prices up or down (depending on the case), the final effect on prices
being determined by the shape and position of the aggregate supply
curve. Furthermore, the final outcome -that is, whether income or
Figure 2-6




prices have changed due to an aggregate demand shift- will be
determined by the shape of the aggregate supply curve (i.e., whether it
is flatter or steeper) and its position (vis-&-vis full employment).
However, our study will deal with the effects of shocks and unexpected
changes on aggregate demand only, an analysis that could later be
extended to consider aggregate supply and price changes.
We now proceed to introduce the various assumptions that will
be changed in order to consider the effects of the shocks under
different structural assumptions.
C. Variations to the Original Framework.
The assumptions and relationships that compose the initial
framework of analysis will be modified to consider more complex
situations, or situations proposed by different theories. Hence, we
proceed to change some assumptions and derive the implications in terms
of the IS-LM structure.
Demand for Money Interest-Inelastic
If we assume that the demand for money does not respond to
interest rates, income will depend solely on the monetary sector
(showing a vertical LM), while the real sector would only affect
interest rates. The Demand for money function will be:
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Md = j(y) + Um
and the LM equation becomes:
Y - B - n(^-Um)
Figure 2-7 shows the determination of income under this assumption
In general, the steeper the LM is, the smaller the effects that
disturbances or changes causing the IS curve to shift will have on
income, and the greater the effects they will have on interest rates.
Investment Function Interest Inelastic
Another situation can arise when interest rates do not affect
investment. In this case, the real sector alone determines the level
of income. This is so because if the money supply changes, with the
subsequent interest rate change, investment will not be affected and,
therefore, the monetary sector’s equilibrium will be forced back to the
old level by greater movements in interest rates. In fact, interest
rates would have to change sufficiently so as to cause the demand for
money to equate the supply at the level of income determined by the
real sector. The resulting investment equation will then be:
I = i + Ui
o
instead of:
I = g(r) + Ui
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Figure 2-8
Determination of Income under an
Interest-Inelastic Investment
Demand Function
On the other hand, the IS equation will be:
Figure 2-8 shows the determination of income under this
assumption.
Fisher Effect
Another case to consider is when price expectations have been
formed and affect the behavior of the demand for investment; that is,
when investment depends upon expected real interest rates, rather than
on current real interest rates(which are, of course, equal to nominal
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where: p = real expected interest rate
r = nominal interest rate
P = actual price level
= expected percent increase in price level.
Thus, the investment function we previously had:
which equals:
Similarly, the IS general form was:
Now, under the Fisher effect assumption it becomes:
I = g(r) + Ui









Y = A + h(r)
where: A=s(G+Uc+Ui).
Y - A + h 2 (r - P 0)
, v hwhere h 2
e
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In other words, the IS will now be a function of r and price
expectations. The new IS implies a shift and rotation from the old IS.
The shift is reflected by the second term in the function, and the
rotation is due to a different slope as reflected by the derivative of
the function with respect to the interest rate (the new slope is
equal to original slope divided by (I +P ).
e
Figure 2-9 shows two IS schedules, one before and one after the
Fisher Effect is introduced. Under the Fisher Effect assumption, the
presence of price expectations lowers expected real interest rates and
so investment increases, given the real return to capital. According
to Fisher, investment demand will increase until the expected inflation
rate has been introduced in the higher nominal rates. This is so
because, as long as there is a difference between the nominal and the
expected real interest rate, there will be a stimulus for investment
demand to expand. On the monetary sector side, it is assumed that
price expectations do not affect its basic relationships, since we have
specified the demand for money as a function of its opportunity cost as
45
measured by nominal interest rates. Therefore, price expectations
M5. However, if we were to introduce a demand for money
equation according to Milton Friedman’s specification, where the prices
of all the assets that are alternatives to holding money are included,
then we would have price expectations affecting directly the demand for
money function, as they measure the opportunity cost of holding money
instead of physical goods.
Figure 2-9
Determination of the IS curve
with Fisher Effect
Figure 2-10
Fisher Effect: the Role of Expectations




will not form part of the LM equation.
However, if we now allow prices to change, instead of having
them fixed, as income rises due to a shift in the IS curve, prices may
also rise, whereupon the supply of real balances would fall and the LM
would thus shift leftwards. The final level of income and prices would
thus depend upon the assumptions about aggregate supply. If full
employment is assumed, price expectations will affect the price level,
but real income will remain at its previous level (See Figure 2-10).
This situation coincides with Fisher’s long run view of the economy as
expressed in the Quantity theory, where "MV=PQ" (M=money, V=velocity,
P=prices and Q=output), and V and Q are assumed fixed in the long run.
Therefore, a deviation of income from the long run level will result in
prices rising until real income returns to its initial level. The net
result in such case would be a new level of prices and nominal interest
rates but the same level of output and real interest rates.
On the other hand, if less than full employment is assumed and
the aggregate supply is not completely vertical, the effect of price




Fisher Effect: the role of Expectations
in Investment and nominal interest rates,
assuming less than full employment.
Figure 2-12
The IS Curve with the Introduction
of the Wealth Effect in Consumption
IS -*• no wealth effect in consumption
IS* -»• wealth effect in consumption
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Wealth Effect on Consumption
Another important variation to the basic framework is the
introduction of Wealth, besides Income, as explanatory variable















GD=Government Debt (seen as part of private sector's
=Price of real capital wealth)
K =stock of real capital
r =interest rate
6 =proportion of the market value of government
debt that is viewed as wealth by individuals.
(6 is less than one, because public may
view part of this wealth as a future burden
on them via future taxes).
Following Spencer, the effects of non human wealth on consumption will
46. See Roger W. Spencer, "Channels of Monetary Influence: A
Survey", in Review. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 1974,
pp. 8-26.




be classified as follows: the Real Balance Effect (through GD and B—)
and the Equity Effect (through P^K).
The inclusion of the wealth effect in the model may prove
relevant to this study due to the effects of monetary policy on
consumption through changes in the value of wealth. This will be
explored when the model including the wealth effect on consumption
(Chapter 3), is used to analyze the effects of shocks under diverse
monetary policy procedures.
The effect of the monetary sector on the real balance portion
of wealth arises directly from changes in MB, r or GD. On the other
hand, the effects on the Equity portion of Wealth arise from changes in
interest rates which in turn change the market value of real capital as
reflected by stock prices, (i.e., stock = ).
In terms of our IS-LM framework, the introduction of these







. C=Consumption in real terms
NW = Net worth of private sector (herein measured by
GD, MR and P
k
K )
Y = Real Income and
47. For a discussion see: Douglas R. Pearce, "Stock Prices
and the Economy", in Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, Nov. 1983, pp. 7-22.
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The IS would be flatter since as r increases (falls), the reduction
(increase) in income to maintain equilibrium in the real sector, would
be greater than in the original framework, due to decreased (increased)
consumption. This can be verified as we obtain the IS that would
correspond to a model with the wealth effect included. The basic
framework specified the IS equation as follows:
Y = A + h (r)
where: A = s(G + Uc + Ui)
and h’r less than zero.





The IS equation becomes:
where: = s (G
and:
-Iy>o - f<o - and Wp >o -
NW
C = f 1 (y) + f 2 (r) + f 3 (p) + Uc
Y = A 2 + h 2 (r)
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while: >A
Therefore, the new IS is flatter than the old one, but it has also
shifted upwards due to inclusion of net worth. Figure 2-12 shows how
the IS is affected when the wealth effect is introduced. The change in
the slope of the IS comes from the fact that:
h2r\ >I hr
and this would make the IS to rotate to IS'. The shift from IS' to
IS(w) is given by:
f (™)
3^P
which made > A.
Interest Elastic Money Supply
This is the situation that arises if it is assumed that money
supply depends on interest rate changes. This may result from a
demand-determined element on the sources of reserves such as
Borrowings, and/or from a possible Excess Reserves behavioral function,
both of which may be depending on interest rates. If this were the
case, the money supply will become a function of interest rates and,
furthermore, it may also become a stochastic function. The effect of
this assumption in terms of the IS-LM structure, is to make the LM
flatter (i.e., enlarge its slope . (See Figure 2-13.)
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Figure 2-13
The LM under an Interest-Elastic
Money Supply Assumption
LH 2 : includes interest-elasticity of the money supply.
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When simulating different monetary procedures, the new LM slope
may yield analytical results which are different than those under the
original assumptions because, for the monetary sector to be in
equilibrium, an interest rate change must be accompanied by a higher
income change to bring the monetary sector back to equilibrium.
D. Disaggregation of the Monetary Sector
The monetary sector is crucial in our study's framework because
the analysis of monetary policy procedures is its main concern . The
framework, as specified above, postulates diverse assumptions on the
demand side of income determination and also describes the basic
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. From such specifications
we see that the main channels by which the monetary sector is linked to
the rest of the economy are: (i) interest rates, as they reflect
relative prices of financial assets (e.g., the price or opportunity
cost of holding money), and affect investment and consumption; and (ii)
money supply changes, since they reflect the relative availability of
real balances with respect to the desirability to hold them, and affect
wealth and price expectations(if price expectations depend upon money
supply changes),
However, in order to analyze the implications of alternative
monetary policy procedures ( each procedure uses a specific instrument
to attain target), a more disaggregated description of the monetary
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sector is required, particularly of the elements that determine the
money supply. As the monetary sector is disaggregated, it will be
possible to formulate behavioral relationships that more accurately
describe the elements that determine the money stock. This will lead
to a relaxation of the assumption of money supply exogeneity .
In fact, the money supply is not considered either exogenous or
controllable by the authorities any more; rather, it is viewed as a
variable which is endogenously determined as it depends on interest
rates as well as on other constraints, such as institutional
constraints and random behavioral changes within the financial system.
To clarify this assertion, we need to proceed to the disaggregation of
the money supply concept, starting with the sources of its creation.
First of all, we must place our analysis within the
institutional framework in which money is created; for this purpose,
the U.S. monetary framework will be used.
D.l Institutional Framework
48. The framework that makes up for the determination of money-
supply may vary from country to country, and therefore the variables
and relationships involved may be different from the ones we will use
in this study. However, the present framework can always be changed to
a specific case study.
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The interaction of the monetary authority (The Federal
Reserve), the Treasury, the banks and the public, will determine the
49
amount of circulating money. It will be assumed that there is only
one type of financial intermediary (banks), which issues one type of
deposits, (demand deposits), and which is required to hold a fraction
of its liabilities at the Federal Reserve in the form of deposits
(required reserves). If total reserves held by banks exceed the
amount of required reserves, computed as a percentage of the bank's
deposit liabilities (i.e., the required reserve ratio determined by the
FED), the difference is called excess reserves. Based on the total
amount of reserves that banks hold at the FED, they can create funds
and acquire income earning assets(i.e., securities and loans to the
public). Therefore, credit creation by banks is based on an expansion
of deposit liabilities, part of which must be maintained as reserves
(required reserves), although the rest (excess reserves) can be lent
out as credit. An increase in the amount of reserves in excess of what
is required to back up deposits implies an increase in bank's capacity
to increase credit. This assigns reserves an important role in the
49. Money = Currency plus Demand Deposits.
50. Actually, in the U.S. banks can satisfy their reserve
requirements with vault cash or by crediting their Federal Reserve
Account. When we refer to Bank’s reserves, we will assume that both
are possible. Hence Total Reserves will include Reserve deposits at
Fed plus vault cash.
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determination of circulating money, while the power to set reserve
requirement ratios gives the Fed an important leverage over deposit and
51
credit creation.
The Federal Reserve Banks (i.e., the monetary authority), on
the other hand, issue deposit liabilities which are owned by commercial
banks, by the Treasury and by foreign central banks or official
institutions. They also purchase income-earning assets (U.S.
government securities and loans to banks), issue Federal Reserve Notes
and hold Gold Certificates and Special Drawing Rights.
Bank reserves are provided to the system mainly through the
Fed's purchases of assets, either government securities (open market
operations) or bank loans (discount operations). They are also
provided by the Treasury's acquisition of gold from U.S. residents,
which is monetized through the Fed by the issuing of Gold Certificates
or by the Treasury's issuing of Treasury currency.
Total reserves plus currency in circulation form the monetary
base or "high powered money” concept. The monetary base is also
defined as the ”net monetary liabilities of the Government (U.S.
Treasury and Federal Reserve System) held by the public (commercial
52
banks and nonbank public).” Its importance in monetary policy
analysis comes from the fact that it is composed of the primary sources
51. See, "The Instruments of Monetary Policy,” in Economic
Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, May 1984, p. 5.
of money creation; it can therefore be decomposed to show the items
that provide or allow for additions to the circulating money supply.
The figure for the monetary base is obtained from the Consolidated
Balance Sheet of the Fed and the Treasury monetary accounts; it
gives the total reserves plus currency in circulation, as well as the
items that add up to them. Table 2-9 shows the elements of a
Consolidated account, and distinguishes the factors that provide (i.e.,
are sources of) reserves, as well as the factors that absorb (i.e.,
53
use) reserves from the monetary system.
Using the Table’s notation, the monetary base is defined
according to its net sources as:
where the factors that are being added are those supplying reserves
(i.e., adding to the monetary base and hence to money supply), while
the ones being substracted are those using reserves.
52. Jerry L. Jordan, "Elements of Money Stock Determination",
in Current Issues in Monetary Theory and Policy. Thomas Havrilesky and
John Boorman, 1976, p. 264.
53. See Ralph Bryant, Controlling Money, The Federal Reserve
and Its Critics. Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1983.
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MB = Sma + BOR + Fit + OA + GS + TOO + SDR -TCH -Dep-NW
Table 2-9. U.S. Monetary Authorities Balance Sheet:
Sources and Uses of Reserves. (Consolidated balance
sheet of the Fed and the Treasury ).
Notes: Free gold=total gold stock minus gold certificates held by the
Fed=part of the gold stock that does not have corresponding gold
certificates. TCOmonetary liabilities of the treasury, that is, stock
of currency issued by the treasury and held by the public, Fed or
depositary institutions.
A brief explanation of each of the items that compose the
monetary base is useful.
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SOURCES OF RESERVES USES OF RESERVES
Federal Reserve Credit: Currency in Circulation (CUR)
U.S. Govnt. Securities (Sma) (outside Fed and Treasury)
Govnt.Securities
Agencies’ Securities Treasury Cash Holdings (TCH)
Acceptances (A)
(Fed notes held by Treasury
plus free gold)
Deposit liabilities of Fed(Dep)
Loans to Banks (BOR)
a) to Treasury (DEG)
b) to Foreigners (DEF)
c) to Others (DEO)
(Discounts and Advances)
Float (Fit) Other Accounts (NW)
Other Assets(OA) Fed’s Liabilities and capital
Gold Stock (GS)







(Reserves plus vault cash)
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Factors Supplying Reserves.
Government Securities (Treasury) and Agency Securities (Federal
government agencies) constitute the major source of reserves in the
american financial system. Through open market operations(oMo),
securities are sold and bought to and from the banking system and so
absorbing or adding to reserves that will increase or decrease the
monetary base and hence the money supply.
If government securities are sold to banks, Sma decreases and
so does RT (i.e., the Bank’s reserve account is debited by the value of
the securities sold). If the Fed decides to buy securities from the
banks, Sma increases and so does RT. Open market operations are then
reflected in Sma, and the Fed has a close control over Sma by
performing OMO in the desired direction.
However, a different situation might arise if Sma is increased
due to new debt created to finance government expenditures. In this
case, Sma will increase and so will DEG, the Treasury deposits at the
Fed. The effect of this new debt on money supply will be complete when
the Treasury spends the new funds, transferring reserves from DEG to
RT. Furthermore, if the Fed decides to sell the newly created
securities to the commercial banks, this would decrease the banks'
reserves at least while the Treasury has not spent the deposits
matching the new debt. After the Treasury has used such deposits,
reserves will be back to the initial level and so will the monetary
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base. However, interest rates will have probably risen.
Acceptances (A) are documents arising from a time draft due to
international trade, and they can be rediscounted at a commercial bank
when accepted.
Member Bank Loans (BOR) are the result of borrowing either in
the form of discounts (a bank rediscounts a paper it owns) or advances
(loans properly), all of which are subject to the discount rate.
Advances are the most common of these types of loans.
The float (Fit) arises when the Fed makes use of his own
deposits at member banks. It constitutes the increased reserves
available to the banking system from the time a Fed's check against its
own account in a member bank is in the power of another member bank, to
the time it is collected. In other words, the float constitutes a
financial magnitude generated by timing discrepancies in the payment
mechanism. The Fed tends, on average, to credit the reserve accounts
of receiving banks sooner than it debits the reserve accounts of paying
banks. Hence, the effect is to increase reserves.
The gold stock (GS) is in the possession of the U.S. Treasury
and not owned by the Fed. When the Treasury buys gold from a resident,
GS increases and bank's reserves (RT) increase too. Then, The Treasury
issues Gold Certificates which are claims against such gold stock and
these are held at the Fed. As this is done, the gold stock is being
monetized since gold certificates are deposited at the Fed at the same
time Treasury Deposits at the Fed are credited. However, no further
change in total reserves occurs. (Note the appearance of Gold
Certificates on the right hand side of Table 2-9). There may be part
of the gold stock against which no certificates have been issued (i.e.,
have not been monetized), a portion known as free gold which is
included under "Treasury Cash Holdings"(TCH).
The Treasury Currency Outstanding (TCO) consists of all current
monetary liabilities of the U.S. Treasury (coins and notes), whether
held by the public, depositary institutions or the Federal Reserve. If
the Treasury increases its outstanding currency, since vault cash can
be held as reserves by depositary institutions, there would be an
increase in total reserves. When new currency is created by the
Treasury, TCO and DEG are increased, but as it is spent the change in
DEG is transferred to RT.
The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) are instruments allocated by
the International Monetary Fund to its members, and are part of the
country's international reserves. They can be used to exchange foreign
currencies among countries.
Factors Absorbing Reserves.
Treasury Cash Holdings (TCH) includes currency holdings by the
Treasury plus Free Gold (i.e., Gold Stock minus Gold Certificates), the
first of which absorbs reserves by holding currency that otherwise
would be in public hands; on the other hand, a change in free gold will
always be accompanied by an offsetting change in DEG, the net effect in
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total reserves thus being zero
Therefore, the Federal Reserve’s liabilities in form of
Deposits are due to:
i) The Treasury (DEG)
ii) Foreign Central Banks or Treasuries (DEF), and
iii) Others (DEO)
In the first ease, as the Treasury pays out from its deposits
at the Fed (i.e., as DEG falls) ceteris paribus, the Bank's reserves
will rise and the money supply too. Treasury deposits (DEG) will also
be affected by tax collection (although in this case the net effect in
RT is zero, as taxes are spent by government); by treasury borrowing
from non bank public (the net effect in RT being zero too); and by
Treasury borrowing from commercial banks (the net effect in RT being
zero too, but money supply increasing if excess reserves are not zero
54
when borrowing occurs). Foreign deposits, on the other hand, arise
from international transactions and capital flows. The relevance and
impact of these in Total Reserves will vary between countries.
The U.S. Monetary Authorities Consolidated Balance Sheet for
July 1983 is shown in Table 2-10.
54. For a simple explanation of the accounts' changes, see
Ritter and Silber, Principles of Money and Banking. 4th edition, Basic
Books, 1974.
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Table 2-10. U.S. Monetary Authorities Consolidated
Balance Sheet. July 1983 . (End of month figures)
Millions of Dollars
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin. Bo.ard of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Washington, D.C. August 1983.
It depicts the elements that compose the monetary base, and gives a
good picture of those elements that are more important in the total
amount of Bank's Reserves.
SOURCES OF RESERVES USES OF RESERVES
Fed Credit






Acceptances 0 Treas. Cash(TCH) 515
Loans(BOR) 1113 Deposits with
Float(Fit) 1066 Fed Banks of
Other Assets(OA) 8597 Treas (DEG) 3815
Gold Stock(GS) 1113 Foreign(DEF) 369
SDRs (SDR) 4618 Other(DEO) 566






Total Sources 163893 Total Uses 163893
Characteristics of the Determinants of the Monetary Base
The elements that determine the Monetary base may or may not be
controllable by the Fed. Table 2-11 characterizes them according to
the degree of the Fed's control over them.
Table 2-11. Factors that determine the Monetary
Base according to the Degree of Fed’s Controllability.
Controllability in this table is determined only
with reference to the potential to control such
element based on its own definition. No other
criteria was used.
Although most factors determining the monetary base are not
under close control by authorities in the U.S. government securities
(Sma) give the Fed enough power to offset movements in the other
elements, since represent the largest component of the sources of

















However, the existence of Borrowings (BOR), which allow
commercial banks to obtain funds besides those arising from open market
operations, and the effect of interest rates on the demand for such
borrowings can have important implications for the Fed’s capacity to
control the overall amount of available reserves, although the Fed
could exert some control over those borrowings by changing the rate it
charges them (i.e., the discount rate).
It has been argued and empirically tested that borrowings
respond to the differential between the Federal Funds rate and the
55
discount rate.
The response of borrowings to changes in the federal funds rate
will make the monetary base an endogenously determined variable, but
their response to the rates’ differential would signal some possibility
56
of the Fed's control over them. Santomero quotes Peter Keir's
conclusion about the relationship between Borrowings and the interest
rates.
"The results strongly suggest that the level of borrowing is
significantly correlated with the spread between the two
rates, but not with the absolute level of those rates."
55. See Robert H. Rasche, "A Review of Empirical Studies of
the Money Supply Mechanism", in Review. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, July 1972, pp. 11-19; and Anthony M. Santomero, "Controlling
Monetary Aggregates: The Discount Window," in Journal of Finance, Vol.
38., No. 3, June 1983, p. 827.
56. Peter Keir, "Impact of Discount Policy Procedures on the
Effectiveness of Reserve Targetting," in Santomero A., op.cit., p. 829.
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He also notes that Kier's results show greater response of
Borrowings to the interest rate differential after 1979, that is, after
the operating procedures were changed to focus on reserve growth rather
than on interest rates. This is a result of such a shift in policy
procedures since after 1979 interest rates have been volatile, while
this was not the case before that year due to the nature of monetary
policy. Therefore, it is expected that evidence on the relationship
between the monetary base and interest rates will be clearer after 1979
than before (i.e., if interest rate movements were very limited before
1979, it would be difficult to observe a conclusive relationship).
On the other hand, among the elements that determine the banks'
reserves, some depend upon international transactions. Table 2-12
further classifies them according to the nature of their determining
factor (i.e., domestic or foreign).
This distinction may prove relevant in certain countries depending on
the role they play in the international arena, on the level of
development of the Government Securities' market, on the type of
foreign exchange system, and on the magnitude of their international
transactions relative to domestic expenditure.
To summarize, the determination of the amount of reserves
available to commercial banks can be expressed as the identity shown in
Table 2-13.
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Table 2-12. Components of the Monetary Base by Origin
(Domestic vs. Foreign) and Degree of Control.
Table 2-13. Reserves Identity.
The relevance and importance of each economic agent determining
reserves (e.g authorities, banks, foreign, etc) will vary from one case
to another depending upon economic, political, and social factors, as
well as on the stage of development of the country under analysis. In
Control Controlled Semi-Controlled Uncontrolled
Origin




TOTAL RESERVES =FACTORS SUPPLYING-FACTORS ABSORBING
RESERVES RESERVES
Securities Currency
TOTAL Borrowings Treasury Cash
Float Government Dep
= Gold stock - Foreign Deposits




well as on the stage of development of the country under analysis. In
the U.S. case, monetary authorities play a predominant role by using
government securities as the main "controlled" mechanism to increase or
decrease monetary reserves. However, it can be said that, in general,
a behavioral or institutional change that may lead to a change in the
"uncontrollable" sources of reserves will be transmitted as a shock on
the supply side of the monetary sector. The effects of such a shock
will depend upon the type of monetary procedures being used. It is
also important to note that, even in the U.S. case, there are other
elements that may affect the money supply, such as the type of exchange
rate system and the relations with other countries. U.S. monetary
policy can affect the dollar exchange rate under the. flexible exchange
rate system (as it presently does), which in turn feedbacks into the
system through the real sector and hence into the level of income and
interest rates. This will in turn affect monetary and real variables,
depending upon the type of monetary policy procedure being used.
D. 2 Model Specification: The Monetary Base, Money Supply, and
Reserves
Finally, in order to introduce the disaggregated monetary
sector into the IS-LM model, it is necessary to link the monetary base
to the money supply, a task which we now undertake.
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The monetary base has been defined as:
(1) MB = TR + CUR
Where: TR = Total Reserves
CUR= Currency in Circulation.
Total Reserves, on the demand side, are divided into required reserves
and excess reserves. Therefore:
(2) TR = RR + ER
Where: RR = Required Reserves
ER = Excess Reserves
It is known that required reserves are a portion of demand deposits,
such that:
(3) RR = rrD
where: rr = required reserve ratio
D = Demand deposits
On the other hand money supply is defined as follows:
(4) M = CUR + D
For the moment, it is assumed that currency (CUR) is a fixed portion
(c) of demand deposits (D), such that:
(5) CUR = c D
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From those relationships, Money Supply (M) and Total Reserves (TR) will
be linked using the relationship between Demand Deposits (D) and
required reserves(Rß). This is done as follows:
Equations 2, 3 and 5 are introduced into equation 1:
(1a) MB = rrD + ER + cD
Solving for D yields:
(6) D -
(c+rr)
Equations 5 and 6 are then substituted in 4:
(Ha) M - <
l/ c >
(c+rr)
The supply side of the monetary base is defined in 7:
(7) MB = Sma+BOR+FIt+TCO+GS+SDR
-TCH-DEG-DEF-DEO
Hence, incorporating 8 into 4a, the relationship between MB and M is
57
obtained giving the following, very simplified, expression:
(4b) M = (Sma+BOß+ -ER )-P-^,
(c+rr)
57. Very simplified, because of the many implicit assumptions
under which such formula was arrived at (e.g., a single type of rr,
exogenous CUR, BOR, etc.).
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The above model specification could be extended to include
different types of deposits, required reserve ratios, interest rate
effects on different items that compose M, and even stochastic
disturbance effects on M via some of its elements. We will introduce
some of these variations later (see "Model Specification:New
Assumptions", below).
D. 3 Model Specification: LM determination
The money supply formula, in terms of its primary sources,
together with the demand for money equation as specified in the IS-LM
model above, will be taken together in order to determine the
equilibrium of the monetary sector.
The Monetary Sector
Demand for money: M = j(Y) + k(r) + Umd
Money Supply: M = (Sma+3oß+..)
Equilibrium: Md = Ms
58. For a very detailed description of possibilities, see
Havrilesky and Boorman. Money Supply, Money Demand and Macroeconomic
Models, Second Edition, Harlan Davidson Inc., 1982.
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This formulation of the monetary sector relationships continues
to assume that the money supply is an exogenous variable, since the
different elements that determine it are so assumed.
From the monetary equilibrium above, the LM is derived and
results in the following equation:





j’(y) j ? (y)
(I+c)
where m =-. r,
o (c+rr)
MB-ER=Sma+BOß+ -ER
j'(y) = derivative of j(y) with respect to y;
assuming j(y) is a linear function of y.
The diagrammatic representation of this equilibrium, and hence
the derivation of the LM appears in Figure 2-14.
Part A of Figure 2-14 shows the determination of the Money-
supply. Part B shows the equilibrium of demand and supply; the demand
for money schedule is drawn for a given level of income and assumes the
disturbance Umd is zero. The money supply is fixed at the level
determined by Part A.
Figure 2—14
Monetary Sector Equilibrium
with a disaggregated monetary sector.
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D. 4 Model Specification: New Assumptions
The next step is to vary some of the assumptions implicit in
the monetary sector.
Determinants of Borrowings (BOR) and Excess Reserves(Eß).
The behavioral relationships determining BOR and ER will change
as follows:
BOR = f(r-rd) + Übor
ER = e(r) + Uer
where: BOR = Borrowings ER = Excess Reserves
r = interest rate rd= discount rate
Übor, Uer = random disturbances
f f (r - rd)> 0 and e’(r) < 0
By adding these assumptions, the money supply becomes a
function of the interest rate, the resulting equation being:
MS = mo [Sma + ...+ f(r-rd)- e(r) + Uer+Ubor]
Hence, the equilibrium of the monetary sector will be given by
an LM of the following general form:
Y = fl + n (r*) + Ulm
Hence Q contains the exogenous elements that determine the
monetary base and the effect of the discount rate on the money supply,
while n is the functional relationship between r and Y that would
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maintain the monetary sector in equilibrium. The latter is being
determined by the relationship between interest rates and money supply
through BOR and ER, as well as by the relationship between interest
rates and money demand. The Ulm term includes the random disturbances
Uer, Übor and Umd.^
Note that ri'(r) is the slope of the LM curve, and it is
greater than in the previous ( original) case. The monetary sector's
equilibrium can now be viewed in Figure 2-15, where the LM is shown
before and after the interest-elasticity of the money supply was
incorporated.
Currency and Demand Deposits as separate functions
The demand for money specification will be substituted by two
different functions, one for currency (CUR) and one for deposits (DD).
This allows currency and deposits to be affected differently by Y, r
and random disturbances; furthermore, we allow for the possibility of
shifts from DD to CUR or viceversa (e.g., a shift from DD to CUR will
59. The LM formulation, showing each of the new assumed




where: °m = reserve multiplier.
C=monetary base sources excluding borrowings.




Determination of Money Supply and
the Monetary Sector Equilibrium (LM) under
an inelastic Money Supply (MS) and
and elastic one (MS').
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be represented by a positive disturbance in the currency function,
which is equal to a negative disturbance in the deposit function).
This may make a difference when we get to analyze diverse monetary
policy procedures in Chapter 4. The general specification of the new












M = DD + CUR
And the LM equation will be the following:
Y = 2+ n 2 (r)
+ Ulm
2
where: fl contains the exogenous elements
that affect reserves (i.e., Sma, BOR, Fit, etc.),
minus excess reserves.
n (r) specifies the relationship
between r and Y that maintains the monetary
sector in equilibrium, mainly determined by the




contains the disturbance terms
of both the DD and CUR equations.
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Interest- Bearing Demand Deposits.
A new type of deposits will now be introduced. They are
interest-bearing demand deposits (IDD), which bear the interest rate
r^. In this case the model will contain a different equation for each:
the demand for IDD and the demand for NDD (not-interest bearing demand














M = CUR + IDD + NDD
where: = rate paid on IDD, assumed lower than r.
60.
When the DD and CUR equations, as specified above, are introduced into
the general form, the detailed LM form becomes:
c 2
Y= m 2 [---■ ] - m 2 + k2 (r) )-m2 (rrUd+Ucur)
where: m 2 = reciprocal of the derivative of
rrj
1
(y) + j (y), (assuming linear model), and
C 2 = MB - ER.
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It is now appropriate to make certain qualifications to these
demand for money equations. Initially, it will be assumed that the
rates paid on IDD are controlled (i.e., have ceilings); therefore, the
opportunity cost of holding this type of demand deposits is
which enables us to specify the demand for IDD as follows:
IDD = J, b (y) ♦ k lb (r-r.) + U id(J




the demand for deposits becomes:














DD - J,(y) ♦ K, (r) - k, b (r} ♦ V dd
Also the LM equation will be:




contains the exogenous elements
that affect reserves, including
n specifies the relation between r
and y that maintains monetary equilibrium
which is mainly determined by the interest
sensitivities of IDD, NDD and CUR.
Ulm contains the disturbance terms
15




We expect that | K *(r)|< |k’(r)| since as r changes, the
opportunity cost of DD increases but part of such cost can now be
avoided by shifting from NDD to IDD. However, should IDD not exist,
there is no way to avoid such cost or any part thereof, and hence
people may respond stronger (decreasing DD more) to interest rate
hikes. In other words, with the possibility that some demand deposits
pay interest, the interest elasticity of total demand deposits has been
lowered. On the other hand, as r increases there may be a shift from
CUR to IDD, since IDD have liquidity properties close to those of CUR
and by shifting to IDD part of the opportunity cost of CUR is avoided.
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62. Where the former is the interest sensitivity(derivative
with respect to the interest rate) of the new demand deposit function,
while the latter is the interest sensitivity of the demand deposit
function when deposits do not bear interest.
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This contributes to the lower interest-elasticity of DD under the
present model, and also means that the interest elasticity of CUR under
the present assumptions (i.e., that IDD exist) is greater than under
the previous case (i.e., when IDD did not exist).
Now, if no ceilings on rates were assumed (i.e., deregulation
of interest rates), the opportunity cost of IDD would tend to zero,
that of NDD would be r and the interest elasticity of NDD would
probably be greater than before, as will that of CUR. As the interest
rate increases, some NDD and CUR will become IDD, therefore, the
interest elasticity of DD (NDD+IDD) will tend to be even lower than
with ceilings (maybe tend to zero). This would also imply a steeper LM
curve, with all the appropriate implications. Table 2-14 summarizes
the cases in which: a) there are no IDD's, b) there are IDD's with
ceilings on and c) there are IDD’s without regulations limiting
, 63
r . ’ s.
l
63. See Tobin, op.cit., 1983.
Table 2-14. Demand for Money Functions under Assumptions of
Non-interest Bearing Demand Deposits (A), Regulated
Interest-Bearing Demand Deposits (B), and Non-Regulated
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CUR + J
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) •> 0 in case C
| K’ z (r) | . < 1 K’ 2 (r) 1case A 1 • cases B and C
I k ', a (r) I n > I k', (r) 1 ncase C 1 1a I case B
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Integration of cases: Borrowings and Excess Reserves
interest elastic plus interest bearing demand deposits.
If the assumptions of an interest-elastic money supply and
interest bearing demand deposits are introduced together in the model,
the former partly offsets the Lm steeperness caused by the latter. The
resulting LM equation would be the following:
(I)Y=m^[C^+f (r-rd)-E(r)-rrK^ (r)-k2 (r)+Ubor-Uer
-rrU -U ]
Hence: Y=£3 ) )~n ( r J+Ulnig+mg(Ubor-Uer)
Where: irreciprocal of [rrJ^ (y)+j 2 (y)] with
respect to Y, assuming linear





n = m^[rrK 1 (r)-k2 (r)]
The following relationships would apply in our final
LM equation (1):
BOR = f(r-rd) + Übor
ER = e(r) + Uer
NDD = J. (y) + k (r) + U
IDD - j (y) + k..(r) + k?r.) +U.
CUE = + k lh + U
MB = RT + CUR = rrDD + ER + CUR
MB = Sma + BOR + fit + TCO+GS+SDR-
TCH-DEG-DEF-DEO
Comparing this LM equation with the previous one (under case c.), we
see that here the components f(r-rd) and e(r) enlarge the slope of the
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This chapter has specified the theoretical framework that will
serve as the basis for the upcoming monetary policy analysis. Such
framework has been modified by the introduction of different hypotheses
or assumptions with respect to the relationships included in the
initial specification. The result has been a set of alternative
frameworks, each with certain general assumptions and one so particular
that makes it different from the rest.
The framework on each alternative case has been summarized in
the respective IS and LM relationships, which will be the key elements
in the analysis of the effects of economic shocks on the level of
income under alternative policy procedures.
The first set of frameworks, in which the monetary sector
relationships were considered at the highest level of aggregation
(i.e., money supply and money demand), considered alternative
assumptions that qualify for diverse IS and LM slopes and positions.
The second set of frameworks, where the monetary sector relationships
are disaggregated, also considered different assumptions , that
resulted in different implications for the slope and location of the LM
curve. In the first part of the chapter we reviewed the analysis
performed by experts in the subject of monetary procedures, and it was
evident that the importance of the IS and LM slopes has been stressed
by many studies. However, we need to analyze in detail the
characteristics of the different behavioral relationships that may be
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essential in determining such different slopes and that, therefore,
will prove to be key relationships in the analysis of monetary policy
procedures.
The disaggregation of the monetary sector allows for a detailed
examination of sources of LM steepness or flatness, that will let us
define monetary policy procedures in terms of variables other than the
money supply and the interest rate (e.g., reserves, monetary base,
etc.).
Chapter 3 will analyze the effect of different shocks (IS and
LM) under different monetary policy procedures, for the "aggregated
models" described in the present chapter. Later, the same type of
analysis will be carried out in Chapter 4, but using the "disaggregated
models" as previously described. In this latter case, due to the
disaggregation of the monetary sector, we will be able to perform the
analysis under policy procedures that will not be considered in Chapter
3 (e.g., using unborrowed reserves as the instrument, etc.).
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE AGGREGATED MODELS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 reviewed several recent studies dealing with the
problem of choosing monetary policy instruments, and described the
theoretical framework used on each of them. Then, it specified the
framework to be used in the present study. Several models,
corresponding to different structural assumptions, have been proposed
and these are summarized in Table 3“1 .
The "aggregated" models (hereinafter some times refered to
simply as "A"s) do not embody the different elements that determine
money supply (i.e., sources and uses of reserves), but rather take
money supply only at its last stage (currency plus demand deposits).
On the other hand, the "disaggregated" models (hereinafter refered to
simply as "D"s) include the elements that make up the money supply from
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A-1 Money supply Money demand Investment Consumption







rate and random term
Same as A-1 Same as A-1 Same as A-1
A-3 Same as A-1 Same as A-1 Interest-inelastic Same as A-1
A-4 Same as A-1 Same as A-1 Fisher effect:
investment





A-5 Same as A-1 Same as A-1 Same as A-1 Wealth effect:
function of wealth




Same as A-1 Same as A-1
D-2 Disaggregated, exogenous Demand for currency
and for deposits
interest-Inelastic





Same as D-1 Same as A-1 Same as A-1
D-4 Same as D-1 Demand for currency
and Dem
for deposits as




Same as A-1 Same as A-1
D-5 Same as D-3 Same as D-4 Same as A-1 Same as A-1
Source: Chapter 2.
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the sources of the monetary base. The initial specification of the
models (i.e., A.l and D.l respectively) is changed in order to consider
alternative assumptions with respect to some of the behavioral
relationships in the model's structure (e.g., borrowings as function of
interest rates, etc.).
The purpose of this chapter is to specify and analyze, for each
of the "aggregated" models, the implications of using either interest
rates or a monetary aggregate as a monetary policy instrument. This is
done under the assumption that the purpose of monetary policy is to
stabilize income; therefore, policy is designed so as to minimize the
64
deviation of income (Y) from its target value(Y*). For each model
specification, as characterized by its respective IS and LM equations,
we will proceed to do the following analysis for each of the suggested
policies:
1. The Policy Procedure.- This refers to the way in which the
value of the instrument is determined given the objective
function, the assumed economic structure, and the instrument
to be used.
2. Implications of Policy Procedure.- This refers to the
implications of the specific procedure for the IS-LM
equations, and for the endogeneity or exogeneity of the key
variables.
64. The procedure by which authorities determine Y* will not
be discussed, but we assume that it is a level considered by them as a
full employment level.
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3. Reduced Form of Income.- It tells us, given the type of
instrument being used in each case, what factors
(disturbances, constants and parameters) determine income.
Deviations of income from the target will arise if a
disturbance appearing in the reduced form is not zero, or if a
constant or a parameter in such equation changes during the
policy period and thus differs from the one assumed by
authorities when setting the instrument value.
Then we will include a section that will summarize the results
obtained, specifically with respect to the effects of shocks or
disturbances to the economic system under each policy procedure. This
section, called "Analytical Simulation of Shocks" will concentrate on:
1. The effect of each type of shock under the same policy
procedure but different economic models. This will give an
overall view of the previous analysis, highlighting the
importance of the different structural assumptions.
2. The effect of each type of shock under the same model but
different policy procedures. Given a particular economic
structure, this section will highlight the implications of
using alternative policies.
Besides the specific assumptions that characterize each model
version (as described in Table 3~1), the following assumptions will be
kept along the theoretical analysis:
1. Policy makers know the model (coefficients and constants) as
specified on each version (unless otherwise specified in a
particular simulation problem), and use it in order to
determine the value of the instrument.
2. Variables used as instruments are observable during the period
for which a value was established. That is, given the
ultimate target value, the objective function, the economic
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structure and the chosen instruments, the authorities
establish a value at which the instrument must be kept for
next period. During such period, authorities will use policy
tools to maintain it at the pre-set value, hence they will be
monitoring the instrument during the policy period. Table 3~2
describes the elements and stages in the formulation of
monetary policy. This table describes the ’’steps” or ’’rules"
that will be assumed as the framework for policy making in the
forecoming analysis.
3. The value of the instrument is revised only at the end of a
long period (which includes several short periods), unless
otherwise specified in a particular case. Such revision is
necessary to assure the consistency of the instrument value
with the achievement of the ultimate objective (income
target).
4. To determine the instrument value, authorities assume that
disturbances are zero.
5. When disturbance shocks are simulated, it is assumed that the
model’s structure (i.e., its coefficients) has not changed,
unless otherwise specified in the particular case. Similarly,














































































































































































































Finally, Table 3~2 shows the steps within the process of
designing and implementing monetary policy. It encloses two different
time spans: the first one is longer term planning in which the desired
ultimate target is determined and the corresponding value of the
instrument is established (rows 1 and 2). Such instrument value is to
be maintained during the short-term periods; therefore short-run policy
consists in keeping the instrument at the pre-set values (row 3). At
the end of the long-term period, the instrument value is revised or
adjusted for changes in the system’s structure, such that its value is
consistent with the achievement of the ultimate income target (row *O.
This process continues with a clear-cut division between short and long
run responsibilities for monetary policy. In the short-run, monetary
policy will try to control the instrument (i.e., keep the instrument
value), while the long-run goal is to attain the ultimate target and
therefore the relationship between the instrument value and such target
is revised.
An alternative to the above scheme will be to assume that the
instrument value can be revised sooner (i.e., before the end of the
long-term period), in which case I„ will not be the same for all j;
step 2 in Table 3~2 would be repeated during some or all of the
short-term periods.
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I. IMPLICATIONS OF EACH POLICY PROCEDURE
A. MODEL A-1
This is the simplest aggregated version of the models to be
studied. It is described mathematically in Table 3-3.
1. Policy Procedure: Interest Rate Instrument
Determination of the Instrument Value
Assuming that Y = Y* is the target level of Income, the value
of the instrument (r) is determined by substituting Y* in the IS and LM
equations and solving them simultaneously for r. Due to the model's
structure, the instrument value for r (r*) turns out to be determined
by the IS alone as follows:





Where: U. = 0 is assumed,
is
*
Then, given the instrument value r authorities will modify the money
*
supply to keep r at r . A diagrammatic description of this procedure
is shown in Figure 3-1 .
Table 3~3. Model A—l: Structural Equations and Resulting IS-LM
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Equations Y = C + I + G
C = aj + bj Y + Uc
I = a
2








IS Y = a + 8r + Uis
LM Y = [Ms - c0 r - Umd]
d
o
Where: i) Fixed prices assumed
ii) Y = income, c = consumption
I = investment, G - government expenditure,
r = interest rate; Uc, Ui, Umd are disturbance terms;
Md = demand for money; Ms = money supply
...x
G+a,+a
2 v om) a = ——£—2- > 0
1-b!






Model A-l. Interest Rate Instrument:
Description of Policy Procedure with
An Interest Rate Instrument.
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Implications of the Procedure
Under this procedure, the money supply becomes a function of
the demand for money and of the real sector via income (Y); therefore,
the money supply will be endogenously determined as can be shown from
the following monetary sector equilibrium condition:
*
Ms = Md = cr+bY + U_, (1)
o o md
Hence: Ms = c r + b (a+Br +U. ) + U . (2)
o o is md
Which lead to the following reduced form for the money supply:
Ms = (c + b 3)r* + b a + bU. +U I md] (3)o o o o is ]
Equation (3) shows that a positive disturbance term from either
the real or the monetary sectors would cause a change in the money
*
supply given that interest rates are kept at r . Furthermore, this
equation also shows that a change in any of the relevant coefficients
(i.e., c , b
Q
, a, 6,) will also cause changes in the money supply.
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Reduced Form of Income
The IS and LM equations embody three unknown variables, two of
which can be endogenous and a third which must be exogenously
determined in order to have a unique solution to our system. Under the
present policy procedure, Income and Money Supply are the endogenous
variables, while interest rates have been set exogenously as described
above. Given these circumstances, the equilibrium locus of income
(that is, the reduced form of income) will be given by the IS equation
alone. It is thus the following:
Y = a + Sr* + U.
is
*
This reduced form of income results in a horizontal line at r , as
depicted in figure 3~2. Such reduced form of income states that any
*
deviation of income from its target value Y will be due to
disturbances occurring in the real sector. Similarly, a change in any
of the real sector's parameters (i.e., a, $), will cause income to
*
deviate from its target value Y . It is useful at this point to review
the effects of a disturbance (either U. or U, ) so that the policy
is lm
procedure that determines interest rates can be fully characterized.
Suppose there is a positive disturbance in the real sector
which leads to a shift in the IS curve. As income starts to rise, a
higher demand for money presses interest rates up; then monetary policy
131
Figure 3-2
Model A-l. The Reduced Form of Income
with an Interest Rate Instrument
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should be such that the monetary authority supplies the additional
funds to meet such expanded demand and to bring interest rates down to
r . The result is the attainment of the pre-established r , but with a
*
level of income that is higher than its target value, Y . On the other
hand, if the source of the disturbance occurs in the monetary sector
(e.g., this will cause income to fall and will press interest
#
rates up above the target r ; policy then will consist in increasing
the money supply in order to offset such pressure and bring interest
rates down. Finally, the new equilibrium will be set at the same level
*
of income Y but with a higher money supply.
From this we can say that if interest rates are used as the
instrument, and the real sector is the only source of instability, a
positive relationship between r and Y will be observed (along the LM)
before policy is implemented, as well as a negative relationship as r
*
goes back to its target level r ( along the IS). On the other hand,
if the LM is the only source of the instability, we will observe a
negative r-Y relationship before and after policy (along IS).
Therefore, under an interest rate policy an observed positive
relationship between r and Y , followed by a negative one will probably
indicate that the IS has been the main source of instability. However,
if the predominant relationship is negative it is more plausible to
interpret it as a signal of LM instability. Figure 3~3 shows the
resulting Y-r relationships under a case of IS instability (A), a case
of LM instability(B), and a combination of both(C).
Figure 3-3
Model A-l. Income-Interest Relationship Under
i) IS Instability, ii) LM Instability and




The last case, where both IS and LM are unstable, reveals that
the r-Y relationship cannot be determined a priori. On the one hand,
the LM will press the relationship to be a negative one. On the other
hand, the IS will press it to be either positive or negative but always
*
approaching r . However the greater the LM instability and the fewer
lags present in monetary policy, the more likely the negative
relationship will be.
2. Policy Procedure: Money Supply Instrument
*
Determination of Instrument value (M )
*
Given Y
, the interest rate is estimated from the real sector as
*
~ Y -a
Then, Fis substituted into the LM equation, and assuming U
md
is zero,
the value of the instrument is determined as follows:
M*
= (b Y* + c f 5)
o o
Under this policy procedure, the money supply is set to remain
*
at M for the period , as is shown in Figure 3~4.
Figure 3-4
Model A-l. Description of Policy Procedure
Under a Money Supply Instrument
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Implications of the Procedure
In this case, monetary policy will only be concerned with




Such changes may arise due to changes in
borrowings, float, etc., which affect the money supply and are not
under direct control of the authorities.
Under a money supply instrument approach, money demand or real
sector movements will lead to interest rate changes such that the
monetary and real sectors are brought back to equilibrium. Therefore,
the interest rate becomes endogenously determined. We proceed next to
obtain the interest rate reduced form in order to capture the different
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factors that will cause it to shift. The resulting equation is:
Reduced form of Income
The IS and LM remain as before, but the equilibrium locus is
given by the following expression:
65. For its derivation see the Appendix.
r = 7k
—\ r(M*-U -b cr-b U. )
(b B+c ) md o o is
o o
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This reduced form for income shows that under a money supply
instrument approach, the level of income will deviate from the target
due to disturbances in both the real and the monetary sectors, and also
to parameter changes in both sectors.




the equilibrium will occur along the LM if the monetary sector
parameters do not change and the disturbance is zero. On the other
hand, if the real sector’s parameters remain unchanged and IT is zero,
the equilibrium locus will occur along the IS curve.
This leads us to conclude that, while a money supply instrument
is in effect, an observed positive relationship between r and Y may
indicate that the real sector is the source of instability, whereas if
a negative relationship is observed, it seems likely that the monetary
sector is the unstable one. These results, of course, will hold only
under a model such as A-1, and under the policy procedure as defined
here. From the reduced forms of r and Y we can then obtain the
derivatives with respect to each type of disturbance as follows:









(b B + c )>0
md o o
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and occur simultaneously the results are not
straightforward. Table summarizes the cases when both U
md
and IL
occur simultaneously, giving the effects of such disturbances on the
equilibrium values of income and interest rates. These, of course,
were derived from the reduced form equations of income and interest
rates, respectively.
From Table we have the following results. (1) If U ,>U. ,md is
the relationship between Y and r will always be negative, if and only
if c <3, and if b <l. If c is greater than 3, U , must be relatively
larger than in order to render a negative Y-r relationship. Hence,
the greater the value of c
q
,
the larger the LM shift must be relative
to the IS shift; and the larger 3 is, the smaller the differnce between
8 Y






in the LM (i.e., a flatter LM); a larger 3 means a larger in the IS
(i.e., a flatter IS). Hence, the flatter the LM is (elastic money
demand) and the steeper the IS is (less elastic investment and smaller






















































































































disturbance must be relative to the real sector’s one, for the negative
Y-r relationship to hold. (2) If U. > U, , a relationship between Yis lm
and r will be positive only if c
q
>6. This final conclusion is a
corollary of the above results.
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B. MODEL A-2
The additional assumption of this model as compared to A-1 is
that now the money supply is a function of both, interest rates and a
random term. The complete model specification appears in Table 3~5.
It is important to notice that the IS relationship remains as in Model
A-1, but the LM has now changed as follows:
The slope of the LM curve is greater than in model A-1 due to
the sensitivity of the money supply to interest rates. The slope is:
While in Model A-1 it was:
The constant of the money supply function represents the
"autonomous" or "exogenous" part of the money supply through which
monetary policy can still affect money supply. In other words, it is
the component of the money supply that is subject to control by the
monetary authorities.













Table 3~5. Model A-2: Structural Equations and Resulting IS and LM
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IS Y = a + 6r + U
IS
LM Y = -J— [ (c 3 -c 0 )r+a 3 + Ums-Umd]
where: i) Fixed prices are assumed
ii) Y = income; C = consumption; I = investment;
G = government expenditures = interest rate;
Uc, Ui, Umd, Urns = disturbance terms; Md = money demand
Ms = money supply; a 3 = autonomous or
controllable portion of the money supply
III) a = ";ya-*>0 6 = < 0
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1. Policy Procedure: Interest Rate Instrument
Determination of the Instrument Value
*
Since Y is the income target, the interest rate that will be








Where: U. assumed = 0
is
a and B known
Within the procedure of maintaining that interest rate,
authorities will use monetary tools (i.e., open market operations) that
will certainly affect the "exogenous " element of the money supply
(i.e., a ) and thus the money supply itself. Figure 3~5 shows that the
position of the MS schedule is determined by changes in a^.
Implications of the Procedure
*
As in Model A-1, with an interest rate instrument r , the money
supply will be subject to changes in the demand for money and in the
real sector through Y. In other words, the money supply will be
endogenously determined. Its reduced form will be obtained as follows:
From the monetary sector equilibrium (MS = MD),
a = (c -c_)r +b Y+(U -U )
3 o 3 o md ms
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Figure 3-5
Model A-2. Description of the Policy Procedure
Where Interest Rate is Instrument
(main relationships)
Figure 3-6
Model A-2 Versus A-l in the Role of Monetary
Policy Under an Interest Rate Policy
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Then:
The difference between and MS of model A-1 arises from , the
coefficient that shows the interest sensitivity of the money supply.
Given that under the assumptions of the present model , the money
supply is a positive function of interest rates, any change in the
interest rate (due to disturbances or structural changes in any sector)
from one IS-LM equilibrium to another will have a milder effect than in
model A-1 because here the money supply is responding automatically to
the interest rate change. This implies that the role of discretionary
policy (via is reduced. This can be seen with the sample case
shown in Figure 3~6, it can be seen that the purpose of monetary policy
#
in model A-1 is to bring equilibrium from point 1 to 3 since r must be
restored. Under A-2 model, monetary policy would have the smaller role
of bringing equilibrium from point 2to 3* In either case, income
deviates equally from the target value.
Reduced Form of Income
The reduced' form of income will be given, as in model A-1, by
the IS equation, given the interest rate policy :
As before, this implies that only IS instability will be permanently
MS = (c +b B)r*+b a+b U. +U ,
o o o o is md
Y = a + Br* + U.
is
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reflected in the equilibrium level of income if interest rate is the
instrument.
2. Policy Procedure: Money Supply Instrument
Determination of Instrument Value
*
Given Y = Y
,
r is estimated from the IS equation, and then
substituted into the LM equation to determine the value at which the
instrument, in this case, must be kept. The result is the
following:
*
Given: r = h and Y = Y
From here we will consider two different possibilities:
A. The case in which is defined and observed during policy
*
period; hence will be kept at during such period.
B. The case in which it is not possible to observe and
therefore a value for MS is set as instrument value. This is the value
that authorities will try to maintain during the policy period.
* kv* , \ Y*~a
a 3 = b OY -(o 3-oo )
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Case A
From the monetary sector equilibrium:
Ms = a +c_r+U = Md = b Y+c r+U ,
3 3 ms o o md
And assuming:
E( %S ■ E '%d - E(U is ■ 0
r = h Y = Y*
Then: a
*
= b Y*+(c -c_)P3o o 3
*
# * V -rt
Or: a 3 - V + (co-o 3)^
Then, under this assumption the money supply will be endogenously
determined by:
which shows the money supply being affected by money supply shocks
others than those affecting and by interest rates, the latter being
affected by U , and real sector’s shocks.J md
Case B
If it is not possible to observe portion of MS not depending
on interest rates) during the policy period, then the money supply
is used as the instrument and its value is determined as follows.
From the monetary equilibrium and with the same assumptions
*
as in case A, the value of MS is derived when equated with money
demand:
MS = a* +C_r+U
3 3 ms
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The instrument value in this case is determined by the demand
for money equation.
Under this assumption becomes endogenous, since it
is being determined within the process of attaining Ms*.
From the money supply equation:
*
But since MS is being determined according to the demand, we have
Hence, will respond to the existence of disturbances
and to changes in interest rates (i.e., to which
are in turn affected by the disturbance of the demand
for money equation and by unanticipated
changes in the real sector. The reduced form of the interest rate will
tell us precisely what disturbances and other elements
affect r and therefore a^.
Implications of the Procedure
The Interest rate will be the variable that will clear the
monetary sector, given a money aggregate target. Therefore
MS = b Y + c f*
o o





r+U = b Y +c f*
3 3 ms o o
a = b Y + c f*-U - c 0 r
3 o o ms 3
149
interest rates will be endogenous together with Y, while
(Case A above) and Ms (case B ) will be the exogenously
determined instruments. We now proceed to obtain the
reduced form for interest rates under each case.
Case A
Given the IS and LM equations, the IS is substituted into
the LM to obtain the reduced form equation for r:
Hence:
Case B
In this case we would have:
Hence:
A graphical interpretation of the implications on each case
is presented in Figures 3~7 and 3~8.
Figure 3-7 shows the effect of a disturbance on the money supply under
IS: Y = a+Br+U.
is
LM: Y = i-((o,-c Jr+a,*+U -U.)






— (a *+U -U -b a-b U. )
b R-c +c 3 ms md o o is
o 3 o
IS: Y = ct+Br+U.
is
LM: Y = -J—(Ms*-c r-U .)
b o md
o
r = —-b a-b U. )





Model A-2, Case A: used as Instrument.
*
case A. Since has been set, such disturbance will cause a higher
money supply together with lower interest rates and income above the
*
target Y . This is so since under this policy procedure monetary
policy does not react to the disturbance as such disturbance does not
affect a . Similarly we could simulate the effect of disturbances on
the demand for money and on the IS, and the results would also be that
interest rates are affected.
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Figure 3-8
Model A-2, Case B (Ms as Instrument): Effects of
Urns and Umd Disturbances
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In Case B, shown in Figure 3~8, a disturbance on the money
supply (i.e., U
ms
>0) would be offset by the monetary procedure under
analysis here. However, a disturbance on the demand for money
(simulated in figure 3-8 too) will cause monetary policy to work in a
direction that will accentuate the expansion or contraction of income.
For example, if such disturbance is positive (i.e., if u
md
>0)» the
greater money demand will move interest rates up and money supply above
*
Ms
, causing monetary policy to react by decreasing money supply. On
the IS-LM equilibrium, the LM would contract by the initial U
md
>o and
then further by the decrease in money supply by the authorities.
*
Hence, equilibrium income would decrease below Y and interest rates
*
would rise while the target M would go back to its initial level.
Summarizing the implications of Cases A and B, we have the
respective reduced forms of interest rate as:
Comparing the equations we can say that: i) random changes in
the money supply affect the interest rate in case A only since in case
B they are offset by monetary policy; ii) in case B, MS being the
instrument amounts to having an interest-inelastic money supply,
because changes in interest rates would, after policy, have no impact
Case A: r = £(a *+U -U -b cr-b U. )
a 3 ms md 0 o is
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on the money supply; iii) Both £ and are negative, but the absolute
value of £ is smaller than that of E,
,
which implies that the effect
a. o
of the disturbances U , and U. on interest rates is greater in case B,
md is
in which case monetary policy will react to the fact that Money supply
has changed due to those disturbances. Hence the effect on interest
rates is enlarged; while the reaction of monetary policy in case A is
nil.
Reduced form of Income
The reduced form for income in Case A and Case B, respectively,
66
is expressed in the following equations:
66. For the derivations, see Appendix*
In sum, when a monetary aggregate is the chosen instrument, we
can only say that a money supply disturbance will cause deviations from
target income and cause interest rate movements only under case A,
while a money demand disturbance will cause greater deviations from
target income as well as greater interest rate fluctuations in case B.
In addition, a disturbance originating in the real sector (i.e.,U. )
1 3
will cause greater deviations from target income under case A, but
greater interest rate fluctuations under case B.
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Case B: Y -
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C. MODEL A—3: Investment Interest Inelastic.
This model will consider a situation in which the determinants
of investment are variables other than the interest rate, such as sales
forecasts, credit availability, etc. As will become evident, the model
delivers an interest-inelastic IS curve, that is, a vertical IS, the
real sector thus becoming the sole determinant of Income. In this
case, the monetary sector can only affect the level of interest rates,
but not income, unless one of the "new" determinants of Investment were
C' fj
related to the monetary sector. The specification of the model,
then, will incorporate an exogenous demand for investment. See Table
3"6.
1. Policy Procedure: Interest Rate Instrument
Determination of Instrument Value
In the models analyzed thus far, the interest rate procedure




The interest rate that clears the real sector was found, and




The system was converted into a recursive system where,
67. This may be the case, but we will not consider it here.
We will stick to the interest inelastic investment.
Table 3~6. Model A~3: Structural Equations and Resulting IS-LM
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Equations Y = C + I + G
C = a x + b x Y
+ Uc












LM Y = -jj— [Ms - c0 r - Umd]b
0
where: i) Prices assumed fixed
ii) Y = income; C = consumption; I = investment;
Io = autonomous investment level; G = government expenditure;
r = interest rate; Uc, Ui, Umd = disturbance terms;
Md = money demand; Ms = money supply
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although we started with three unknowns(i,e., Y, r and M), the value of
Y was set exogenously, then the value of the instrument r was
determined by the real sector’s IS, whereupon such Y and r values
determined the value that M would have in the LM equation. In the
present model, however, the value of the interest rate cannot be
determined by the real sector; furthermore, Y will be determined by the
real sector while monetary policy will have no way to pursue a policy
*
directed to attain a target Y . Deviations of income from the desired
*
Y are due to the real sector's elements and cannot be prevented
through monetary policy. Given the level of income generated in the
real sector, any interest rate would be consistent with it. Therefore,
#
it is not possible to set one single value (r ) that would serve as the
*
instrument value to attain Y
.
The only way to change the level of
income under the present circumstances is through fiscal policy; the
scope for monetary policy is therefore limited and cannot be used to
achieve income stabilization.
It seems appropriate to say then, that under the assumption of
a vertical IS, monetary policy can only be used to stabilize interest
*
rates or the money supply. In the first case, r would be specified by
*
past experience and so monetary policy would aim to keep r through
money supply movements ( money supply thus becoming endogenous). This
is the approach we will follow for our analysis in this section.
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Implications of this Procedure
This new approach to monetary policy implies that income is
determined by the IS as:
*
Then, if r has been specified, MS becomes endogenously determined with
its reduced form being:^
Figure 3~9 describes the IS-LM and the monetary sector equilibrium
under the present assumptions, and simulates the effect of a shift
(increase) in money demand on money supply, since income remains at the
initial level determined by the IS. Movements go from A to B and to C
in the monetary sector’s diagram, and from A to B and back to A in the
IS-LM equilibrium diagram.
The money supply in this case will be subject to disturbances
occurring in either the demand side of the monetary sector (i.e., U „)
md
or in the real sector(i.e., Uc or Ui).
68. For derivation see Appendix.
Y = (a
i
+ 1 + G + W
b
#
MS = -7—r— (a + + I + G+ U+U. ) +c r + U .
1-b 1 cio md
Figure 3-9
Model A-3. Effects of a Money
Demand Disturbance Under an
Interest Rate Policy Procedure
Figure 3-10
Model A-3. Effects of an IS Disturbance under
A Money Supply Policy Procedure
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Reduced Form of Income
In this model, income will be determined by the IS equation.
This means that income will deviate from the initial level only if U
c
and/or were positive,and/ or if any of the real sector’s autonomous
variables or coefficients were to change. If we assume authorities use
*
fiscal policy to attain the desired Y , having estimates of the other
*
factors affecting the real sector, income will deviate from Y only if
U
q
and/or are no longer assumed zero, , or if authorities have
mis-estimated the parameters and constants on the IS equation.
However, as was explained before, income is not considered a target for
monetary policy under the present framework.
2. Policy Procedure: Money Supply Instrument.
Determination of Instrument Value
If authorities choose to stabilize the money supply instead of
interest rates, we will proceed assuming that the target value of M
*
(i.e., M ) is determined by past experience, a level considerated
*
adequate; therefore, whenever M deviates from M , monetary policy will
act to eliminate the difference.
Implications of the Procedure
*
Under this approach, M is set exogenously and Y is determined
by the real sector, leaving interest rates to be determined
endogenously by market forces . Its reduced form is given by the
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following expression:^
Where: c < 0, b, > 0, b > 0o 1
*
G = fiscal policy variable established
#
to attain Y
, given I and a .
Under these circumstances, an increase in the demand for money
via U
md ,
or an IS shift will affect interest rates, with no offseting
monetary policy action as a response. The only reason for monetary
policy to respond to market forces under the present model would be if
the money supply changes as a result of forces outside monetary policy
control (e.g., increase in borrowings or excess reserves of banks) or
if the money supply is interest-elastic; however, the model
specification does not allow explicit consideration of these changes,
thus assigning monetary policy a rather passive role. Such
considerations will be possible in subsequent specifications of the
model.
Figure 3— lo shows the effects of an IS shift under the present
*
MS policy. A positive disturbance in the real sector would lead to
higher interest rates, due to the increased demand for real balances
*
which is not met by additional supply (since M is fixed).
69. See derivations in Appendix.
r “ ~7T' C 1 °h 1 (a, +l+G* + U +U.) +—C
o
” b 1) 1 0 1 °o °o
162
Reduced Form of Income
The reduced form of income in this case is again given by the
real sector, that is, by the IS equation.
Concluding from the above two cases we can say that, under a
#
policy of maintaining r, a shock to the LM via U will bring
md °
temporary interest rate movements which, after policy reaction, will
drive interest rates back to their target level. On the other hand, if
*
the policy was to keep M , interest rates would have changed and no
policy reaction would have occured. In both cases, income remains at
its initial level since the real sector has suffered no change.
If the real sector's coefficients or disturbances change, both
interest rates and income will be affected initially. Then, under the
*
r policy, monetary policy will be expansive if the real sectors'
change was expansive and it will be restrictive if the real sectors'
*
change was also restrictive. Under the M policy, on the other hand,
the changes in Y and r due to the real sector's behavior will remain
unchanged since no monetary policy action will arise.
These results lead us to conclude that the instrument choice
problem for monetary policy under the A~3 model assumptions lie in the
policy maker's preference of a stable interest rate over a stable money
supply. The role of monetary policy in income stabilization is nil
under the assumption that the real sector is not affected by interest
rates; therefore, the roles of monetary and fiscal policy are clear
cut: monetary policy to pursue either interest rate or money supply
163
stabilization, and fiscal policy to pursue income stabilization.
D. MODEL A-4: FISHER EFFECT ON INVESTMENT
This model, incorporating the effect of price expectations on
investment, is specified on Table 3~7.
1. Policy Procedure: Interest Rate Instrument
Determination of Instrument Value
#
Given Y = Y and that authorities estimate price expectations
as Pe and assume disturbances are zero, from the IS equation in Table
3~7, the value of the instrument is obtained as:
Where: B = r—-
-1 +Pe
This is the value at which authorities will keep the level of
interest rates. In this case, as before, the money supply will be
*
changing in the process of trying to attain r .
Implications of the Procedure
While establishing an interest value as the short-term focus
for policy, money supply becomes the endogenous variable. Its reduced
70








Table 3~7. Model A-4: Structural Equations and Resulting IS-LM
(Fisher effect included)
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Equations Y = C + I + G
C = a
x
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IS and LM LM: Y = ( Ms - c 0 r - Umd )b
0
IS: Y = a + 0 2 r
- 6 2 P e + U g
where: i) Y = income; C = consumption; I = investment;
G = government expenditure; r = nominal interest rate;
p = expected real interest rate
P e = expected rate of inflation
g 2
(Ll_
1 +P e 1 + P e
where g 2 < Bi (see chp. 2)
Ms = money supply; Md = demand for money
Ui, Uc, Umd = respective disturbance terms.
ii) Bi is the IS slope in previous specifications.
iii) P e is a pre-determined variable.
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Reduced Form of Income
The reduced form will be given by the IS equation.
which indicates that unpredicted changes in price expectations, in a
and in B
2 >
as well as a positive real sector’s disturbance will affect
income.
However, different assumptions about how price expectations
(i.e., Pe) are determined, may render different conclusions with
respect to the elements determining income. The following analysis
will consider two initial possibilities: one, that price expectations
are mainly determined by past rates of income growth; and second, that
they are determined by past rates of money growth. Then, within each
of those possibilities we will study several cases, as described in
Table 3~8. The implications of each case are now considered.
Case A. Price Expectations determined by Income Growth.
The assumptions that will be kept in analyzing this relationship within
the complete IS-LM model are: i) prices are not explicitly explained
70. For derivation see Appendix
*
MS = (c + bjj r + ba - b R
o
Pe+ bU. +U .































































































































































within the model, ii) price expectations depend upon past changes in
income, hence the price expectations is a "pre-determined" variable,
defined as follows:
iii) authorities take into account the existence of price expectations
when setting the value of the monetary policy instrument, using their
own estimate of Pe (hereinafter refered to as Pe). And iv) It will
still be assumed that the relevant target variable is Income, without
distinguishing between real and nominal income.
Now we proceed to consider further possibilities within this
framework:
i)Policy is revised at end of each short-term period.
*
AThis means that r is being changed as authorities estimate Pe
are changing. In this case we assume authorities estimate price
expectations as a function of past income growth. However, the next
question is if Pe is estimated correctly or not.
i.l) Pe estimated correctly
In this case, Pe = Pe, and when this assumption is
substituted into the reduced form equation for income we obtain the
71











i. 2) fie estimated incorrectly.
In this case the reduced form of income becomes:
Y
ij
- Y’ij+ B 2 (Kj- fe ij )+Uis
Where is a random, estimation error.
In order to capture the implications of this situation, the
case in which Pe>Pe is simulated in Figure 3—ll . The initial
equilibrium is given by and at Y and r^, given initial price
expectations Pe^ . These change to although authorities estimate
they have changed to which is greater than the true expectations.
# #
In the revision process for determining r , authorities establish as
*
the instrument value that must be maintained to attain Y
. However, as
the figure indicates, such interest rate level will deliver a level of
#
income equal to which is less than Y . The problem has been that,
due to the incorrect estimation of Pe, authorities have fixed the
instrument value too high; hence, monetary policy is used to attain
such interest rate level, causing nominal rates to rise more than the
increase in true price expectations. However, if we follow the dynamic
implications of the present model specification, the fall in income
will lower expectations falls to in Figure 3- 11, Diagram II).
71. This equation assumes that the rest of the parameters
(e.g., a, etc.) were correctly estimated by authorities when setting
the instrument value. For the derivation see Appendix.
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Figure 3-11
Model A-4. Case A, r Policy, Revised
Every Short Term, and £e > P e
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But if the effect of the fall in income is correctly forecasted, then
falls just as the true fell (to such that :
which will imply no further change in income (from Y ), although
*
interest rates have changed to since their instrumental value was
revised after the new price expectations were estimated (Diagram II of
Figure 3~11).
ii)Policy is not revised at end of short term period
72
In this case the reduced form of income is given by:
Where the j's correspond to the short-term periods within the long-term
ones; and the i’s correspond to the long-term periods.
Under this assumption, since policy is not revised, the error
(Pe-Pe) is not random, but a function of past growth rates of income
that have not been used in estimating price expectations. This is the
key difference between this case and the former where policy is revised
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but Pe was incorrectly estimated.
In this case, then, Y„ will be affected by changes in income
that occurred in past short-term periods(j’s) of the present long term
period i, and that are themselves affected by U. disturbances that
is
were in effect during such periods. Only when j = 1 the result will be
similar to the cases where policy is revised every short-term period.
Figure 3“12 describes the implications of the no revision assumption
for the cases in which price expectations are under and over estimated
by authorities (i.e., when ?e>f, e and Pe<Pe, respectively). These
cases are equivalent to the IS shifts caused by disturbances or by
parameter changes, with the difference that the effects of price
expectations on income will further affect price expectations in
following periods. In addition, since there is no revision, there will
be a continuous change in income and in money supply to accommodate
such changes.
Figure 3-12 suggests the following conclusions. When price
expectations rise (and hence are underestimated by authorities), the
#
interest rate that is being used(r ) is lower than the necessary to
* *
keep Y ; hence, monetary policy results in an income level above Y .
This leads to greater expectations that press for even higher levels of
income. On the other hand, when price expectations fall, the interest
rate value that has been pre-set is higher than that necessary to keep
# *
Y ; hence, Income falls below Y . This leads to further reductions of
price expectations and income.
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Figure 3-12
Model A-4, Case A, r Policy, Not Revised in
Short Run: Effects of a Change in Price Expectations
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What this implies is that if the value of the instrument is not
revised after each short period, past shocks to the real sector will
affect present income; specifically, they will cause deviations of
present income from its target. This would be aggravated if the
formation of price expectations is such that more recent events affect
expectations stronger than less recent ones.
In the case in which r* is revised but is not perfectly
forecasted, deviations of income from the target will exist but may not
be as high; it will depend on how Pe are forecasted. If is
*
related to past shocks (case ii above) , then (Y. ,-Y ..) will beH
ij ij
affected by them, but if (Pe.-Pe.) is random (case i. 2 above), then
J J
#
(Y. .-Y . .) may also be random,
ij iJ
Case B. Price Expectations depend upon past growth rates of
Money Supply.
This assumption implies that:
The rationale of the equation is that growth of the money-
supply may be viewed as a better indicator of price changes. We now
proceed to state different possibilities depending on whether revision








i)Policy is revised at the end of each period
i.l)Pe estimated correctly.
In this case, since Pe_ = Pe^, the instrument value is
given by:
and as in case A above, the reduced form of income is:
However, the value of r„ may differ from that in case A above.
In Figure 3"13, suppose price expectations rise to but they are
perfectly predicted by the authorities (Pe = Pe). Hence, r* is
adjusted to keep Y* given the new Pe, rising from r* to r*. Monetary
policy will be directed to attaining r*, which implies a falling money
supply (hence LM shifts to However, as money supply falls, Pe
falls too and so does r*, with the consequence that the money supply
will rise again to attain the lower r* (between r* and r*).
Therefore, in this case the final equilibrium would be set at
an interest rate lower than that of case A above due to the different










Model A-5, Case B, r policy, Revised
in the Short Run: Effects of an Increase in
Price Expectations Assuming Authorities
Forecast £ e Perfectly
(i.e., Pe = P e)
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i.2)Pe is estimated incorrectly
In this case Pe_ * , with similar results to case A
above. The reduced form of income is :
In this case we can distinguish two situations: one in which
Pe. .<Pe.
. (underestimation), and one in which Pe. .>Pe. .
ij ij ij ij
(overestimation). Suppose Pe rise but is overestimated ( Pe>Pe ) as
it is revised. This means that the instrument value r* is set at a
higher value than that needed to keep Y* . The money supply falls to
keep the new r*, while the growth rate of the money supply decreases
causing Pe to fall again and making another revision necessary. If we
assume the second revision estimates the change in Pe correctly, no
further unexpected consequences in Y* will arise.(See explanation in
case A above).
The key element that could make the final results here to
differ from those in case above A are: i) the relationship that
determines Pe (e.g., M in this case and Y in the case above); ii) the
relative changes in money and income after each shock, since these have
further effects on Pe; and iii) the lag structure that determines Pe
(e.g., whether more recent values have greater impact than older ones).
Y.
.
= Y*. .+ 8 O (Pe. .-Pe. . )+U.ij ij ij ij' is
Where (Pe. .-Pe. .) is random,
ij iJ
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ii)Policy is not revised each jth (short-term) period, but only every
ith (long term) period.
If j = 1, which means that we are within the first short-term
period in the long-term period, the results would be equal to those in
which there is revision, with all the different possibilities. If j>l ,
the situation will change. The results are derived as before (Case A)
and so we obtain the reduced form of income as:
However, there is an important difference between these results
and those in the case in which expectations depend on past income
changes. In the latter,past income changes are affected by past
errors, while in the present model, the reduced form of income contains
past changes in the money supply which are not only affected by U is
errors but also by errors (see the reduced form of the money
supply).
Therefore, under the present assumptions deviations of income
from target will be affected by current real sector shocks plus past
real sector shocks and monetary sector shocks.
Figures 3~14 and 3“15 show the dynamic effects on income and
interest rate behavior, of a real sector’s shock and a monetary
sector’s shock.
M. -M.
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Figure 3-14
Model A-4, Case B, r Policy, No Revision in
Short Term Periods: Effect of An IS Shock (Uis > 0)
Figure 3-15
Model A-4, Case B, r Policy, No Revision
in
Short Term Periods: Effects




- Policy Procedure: Money Supply Instrument
Determination of Instrument value
In this case, given Y = Y* and Pe, r is estimated from the IS
as follows:
and substituting them into the LM equation gives the value at which the
money supply must be kept to attain Y*:
MS* . Y*(b
0 <£-) - h
Implications of this Procedure
Under this procedure the interest rate becomes endogenously
determined. Its reduced form is obtained by equating LM and IS given
MS = MS*. The procedure is described in the Appendix, where the
reduced form equation becomes:
Reduced Form of Income
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However, we will now consider the alternative possibilities
with respect to the revision of policy and the estimations of price
expectations.
Case A.Price expectations are a function of past income growth.
In this case, price expectations depend upon past income growth
rates. Substituting the value of MS* into the reduced form of income
above we obtain the reduced form of income under the present
assumptions:
which shows that deviations of income from target Y* will be affected
by differences between estimated and actual price expectations. On the
other hand, if Pe = Pe then price expectations would not be
responsible for income deviations from the target. We now proceed to
examine this case under different assumptions, as expressed in Table
3-8 above.
i) MS* is revised every short-term period
i.l) Pe is perfectly forecasted.
MS* is revised at the begining of each short-term period and
Pe is correctly estimated. Under these circumstances, if Pe
increases (non-randomly), MS* is revised to account for such increase
and, since Pe is correctly estimated, the income target Y* is
maintained.
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Nothing else occurs since Pe depends upon income changes and
Y* is attained
,
albeit higher interest rates. Figure 3— 1 6 depicts the
analysis in IS-LM terms.
Introducing this assumption into the reduced form of income we
obtain:
i. 2) Pe is not perfectly forecasted.
In this case, the reduced form of income becomes:
Figure 3 — 17 shows the effect on income of such a situation,
assuming Pe<Pe. The initial equilibrium is given by and IS^.
If there is a random increase in price expectations, and therefore Pe
are under-estimated by authorities, the actual IS is IS while
authorities use to set the value of the policy instrument.
Revision renders a new money supply value according to the estimated
IS, which is greater than the money supply needed to bring the economy
*
back to Y (point 2 in the figure). The result is that the economy is
driven to point 3 in figure 3~17, where income is above target.
Furthermore, due to the assumption that price expectations depend upon
past income growth, they will grow further as income rises. If this is
• V*<vT7s;><V.. lJ -> Ad [J )
Y. .=Y..* + - (c
n B 0 (Pe. .-Pe. .)+cA U. -B„ U . )lj ij b
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Where: (Pe - Pe) is random.
Figure 3-16
Model A-4, Case A, Ms Policy,
Revised in Short-Term Periods: Effect
of a Change in Price Expectations,
Figure 3-17
Model A-4, Case A, Ms Policy,
Revised in Short-Term Periods: Effect
of a Change in Price Expectations,
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forecasted by authorities the money supply is adjusted and income
remains at Y
,
but if expectations are under-estimated again, income
will continue growing and so will interest rates since authorities are
trying to adjust the money supply to such mis-estimated price
expectations. Should price expectations be overestimated, the
situation changes, as Figure 3~18 shows. Starting at the equilibrium
where and are equated (point 1), then price expectations rise
but authorities overestimate them. Hence, while the new IS is the
authorities estimate it as then, as revision of policy takes
place, the value of the money supply is set smaller than the necessary
*
to keep Y . Authorities believe they are taking the system to point 2
in the figure, but they are really taking it to point 3, which renders
a level of income below target. Furthermore, since income fell, price
expectations are adjusted back down and the behavior of income will now
depend on how this adjustment is estimated by authorities: if it is
correctly estimated, income remains at Y , but if it is overestimated
it will fall below "t
From these results we can see that a price-expectation
mis-forecast will have different effects depending on the nature of the
error. If underestimated,, income will be above target and maybe
continuously rising, interest rates will be lower and money supply
higher than if a perfect forecast had been made. If overestimated,,
income will be below target and interest rates will be higher and money
supply lower than if a perfect forecast had been made. Now, if the sum
184
Figure 3-18^
Model A-4, Case A, Ms Policy,
Revised in Short-Term Periods:
Effect of a Change in Price Expectations
3-19
Model A-4, Case A, Ms Policy, No Revision
in Short-Term Periods: Effect of a Change (positive)
in Price Expectations
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of such forecasting errors is zero (i.e., E(fe-Pe) = 0), then, on
*
average, we can expect that, ceteris paribus, the income target (Y )
will be achieved. On the other hand, if the correlation between
estimation errors in different periods is zero (no autocorrelation), we
*
«
can expect that temporary deviations from Y due to misforecasts of Pe
will not be very large.
ii) Policy is not revised every short term period
The fact that policy is not revised implies that the value
*
initially set for the instrument (M ) will remain at such level for all
short-term periods within a long-term period.
For the case where j = I(i.e., the first short-term period
within the long term period), the results will be similar to the
*
revision case above since M has just been revised. However, for the
cases where j>l, changes in price expectations, whether random or due
to recent short-run experience, will affect income and interest rates
*
because M is not being revised. This means that shifts in the IS due
to changes in price expectations will determine the equilibrium of
income as the new IS intersects the LM curve. This is shown in figure
3-19.
If expectations are that prices will increase, income will rise
*
and so will interest rates. No policy reaction will occur, since M
remains at its pre-set level. Income rises, affecting expectations
further and causing further IS shifts with the resulting higher income
186
levels.
The reduced form of income is the following:
Therefore, Y_ is affected by present disturbances on both the
real and the monetary sectors (A_) and by past disturbances as they
affect past levels of income.
CASE B. Price Expectations affected by past money growth.
Since the policy procedure under analysis is one in which the
*
money supply is fixed at MS , if expectations depend upon MS growth
-which itself depends upon MS changes-, expectations will be constant
as long as MS is maintained. Furthermore, revision of MS to adjust
for changes in price expectations is irrelevant and income will then
not be affected by them unless they change randomly. In the latter
case, however, the random shock would be treated as any other random
disturbance such as U. . The only further consideration in this case
is
would be an assessment of the validity of the assumption that the money
*
supply can in fact be maintained at level M . As we know, the issue of
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debate.^
E. MODEL A-5. Wealth Effect on Consumption.
We now introduce the effect of wealth on consumption, as
explained in Chapter 2, resulting in the complete model presented in
Table 3~9. Notice that the table shows two alternative cases which
differ only in the definition of the Net Worth (NW) variable. We
intend to analyze both cases, as economists have different views with
respect to the definition of that variable that better represents what
people view as wealth.
1. Policy Procedure:lnterest Rate Instrument
Determination of Instrument Value(r*)
#
Given target income Y , the value of the instrument is obtained
from the IS equation:
73. See, for example, Ralph Bryant, Controlling Money,
Brookings Institution, Washington , D.C, 1980.
CASE 1 : NW = MS+GD+K.
















































































































































































































































Implications of the Procedure




while in the previous models it was g = ——— . Clearly, | |>|g| .
Furthermore, we have new variables affecting the IS which are
predetermined or exogenous from both the real and the monetary sectors.
A comparison between the IS before and after the Wealth effect is done
in Figure 3~20.
If interest rates are used as instruments, the money supply
becomes endogenous and so will government debt and net worth (NW). To
identify the different factors that will affect the money supply, we
look at the money market equilibrium and obtain the reduced form for
the money supply:
Where: o<l<l, 0<b I <l, o<b <l, c’ <0 and c. <O.1 o
The present framework gives us the opportunity to analyze fiscal policy
in the context of monetary policy , as will be clear next.
n + O 1
a _ fl_B 1 1-b1
# a 1 +a 2 1
MS = C r +b (G
v
-T )+- -- —+
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Model A-5: Effect of the Introduction
of the Wealth Effect in the IS
IS
L :
Before inclusion of wealth effect on consumption.
IS 2: Including wealth effect on consumption.
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Under an interest rate policy instrument, we can see that the
reduced form for the money supply shows the fact that increasing
government deficits are financed at least in part by expanding the
money supply; the expansion of the money supply will depend upon the
effect of such government deficit in the demand for money. The
complete transmission mechanism is the following:
Change in Government Deficit (initial GDebt
change) Change in Consumption due to NW
change Change in Income + Change in Demand for
Money ■> Change in the Money Supply to keep
#
r -► Change in Government Debt.
We will now obtain the magnitude of these effects on the money
supply, using the reduced form equation above. When both government




From this we can distinguish two possibilities: (1) When there
is not an increase or decrease in the government deficit; this means,
= which causes the following money supply change:
b
AMS, = -—— (AG -b.AG ) = b AG = b AT .
t 1-b
1
t 1 t o t o t
(2) When there is a deficitary change in the government budget;
that is, when AGt >AT t> in which
case the change in the money supply
becomes:
b 1 AG - b AT
AMS, = (AG -AT. ) + b ------
t 1-b
1
t t o 1-b
1
AMS = b AY. = AMd.
t o t
1
Where: AY = T-r (AG -b 1 AT )+ ——t l-b
1
t 1 t 1-b
1
b 1 b



























Both of these possibilities are consistent with either a
balanced or an unbalanced budget, as Table 3— lo indicates. In such
Table we give the effects of the budgetary changes on the money supply
of period t and of period t+l, since, as the reduced form equation for














On the other hand, the reduced form equation for the Government
Debt shows the part of the increasing government deficits that come to
be financed by government debt in the new equilibrium:
Then, when there is a change in the government budget variables
A G and AT, government debt is affected as follows:
75. See Table 3— lo. For proof, see Appendix.
1 b




t t t t-n-1 t-n-1 t-i t-i
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From there, if the changes in G and T are equal, we have that:
AGD = -b AG..
t o t
But if the change in G is greater than the change in T, we have:
The reduced form for GD shows that the AGD equals the
increase in the deficit minus the amount of such deficit that generated
#
money supply expansion, due to the policy of keeping r . Furthermore,
the equation shows that GD is also affected by the deficit of period
t:
lb
Recall that AMS = (G -T ); therefore, GD is also the residual
t+l i t t t 1




The implications of the above results are analyzed with more
detail in the following section, together with the effects on income.




' 4Gt- AVT^(AGt- AT t )-i^(AGt- bi iTt ) -
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Reduced Form of Income
The reduced form is given by:
The equation shows that only IS disturbances would cause income to
change; furthermore, it reveals that current and past increases in
government deficits, as well as deficits perse, will also affect
present income.
We now proceed to illustrate the trasmission mechanism of a
change in the Government deficit, under the present assumptions.
Suppose that A(G
t
the effects start to operate in the goods
market as follows: there is an additional demand for goods and
services that affects income, thus shifting the IS rightwards. Before
the money supply increases, the deficit is financed with government
debt (GD increases) and therefore, net worth (NW) increases as well as
consumption. The IS shifts further right. In Figure 3—21 as the
demand for money increases due to higher income, interest rates start
*
rising above the target level r and therefore monetary policy is
called into action: the money supply will be increased to bring r back
£
to r . (See Diagram II). As the money supply expands to the LM
*
moves right until r is achieved, given The new equilibrium is
*
set at r ,
+lGD























































































































attain the target level of interest rates, but income is off-target.
The effects on government debt need yet to be analyzed, since this has
also become an endogenous variable as was shown in the section above.
To continue with the illustration, Figure 3-22 shows the IS and
LM in diagram I, the money supply reduced form equation in diagram 11,
and the reduced form for the government debt in diagram 111. Starting
at diagram I, we obtain the equilibrium level of income given the IS
and the r
. (Initially we had r and Y ). The equilibrium level of
income determines the money supply needed to keep the money market in
equilibrium, as shown in diagram II Then the Government debt is
plotted against income in diagram III: for a zero income level
government debt equals the deficit (G-T), but as income rises, money
supply rises and hence part of the deficit is financed by an increase
in money supply, reducing the government debt. An increase in (G-T)





Therefore, as increases, the IS shifts to and the
*
money supply increases to which maintains r at r ; on the other
hand, the government debt function shifts to the right and the new
level of GD is determined by the new level of income Y , hence giving
Figure 3~22 shows a decrease in the government debt as the result
77. Recall that AGD = G-T -AMS
,
which is tantamount to:
AGD = G.-T.-b AY
tt t o
Figure 3-22
Model A-5, Case 1 Interest Rate Policy:
Effect of a Change in the Budget
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of the increased (G-T) although this is not the only possible outcome.
Figure 3~23 shows 3 different possibilities: government debt rising,
falling or staying constant, as the deficit is increased; the one that
will represent the final outcome will depend upon the effect of G-T in
the IS(IS shift), which depends upon the sensitivity of consumption to
net worth, (i.e., given by "1" ) .
Finally, Figure 3~24 shows the results of diagrams II and 111
of figure 3~23 together, where money supply and government debt are
taken as alternatives given the restriction that AGD+AMS must equal
G-T. The greater the amount of the deficit financed with MS, the lower
the amount financed with GD. At any point in time, we can identify the
distribution of the deficit financing between GD and MS. Such points
represent equilibria for the economy, given all the relationships that
qualify economic behavior and the economic policies that the
authorities are implementing. We could venture to say that, given the
economic structure and the policy under effect, the economic system
delivers an "Indifference Map" which determines the distribution of the
deficit between money supply and government debt. We now proceed to
identify what determines the shape of such indifference map. From the




and are the "key" elements determining it, as follows:
1. If lb = 1-b., AMS = b Y+AG-AT and AGD = ~b Y. Hence, an
O I o o
increase in (G-T) will cause a distributional change between MS and GD
202
as Diagram I in figure 3-24 shows, biased towards a larger share for
MS.
lb
3. If lb < 1-b
,




AGD = -b Y+(l--——)(AG-AT). In this case, if (1-(A G-AT)>b Y, then
o i-b 1 I~bl o
GD will increase as diagram II in Figure 3~24 shows (from point 1 to
3). This latter situation would be one in which the indifference map
is not biased towards the MS.
A conclusion here is that the lower b
,
1 and b„ are, the less
o’ 1 ’
biased towards MS will the indifference curves be, which implies that a
change in (G-T) will bring a smaller or no increase in the proportion
of the deficit that is financed with money supply expansion.
Now, we go back to the reduced form equation for income, and proceed to
illustrate the mechanics of a monetary disturbance , which according to
such equation, does not affect income. As figure 3~25 shows, if the LM
shifts due to the U interest rates start rising, monetary policy
*
will be expansionary in order to restore r , and government debt will
decrease given that G-T is fixed. The net worth variable remains
*
unchanged and as a result Income Y is restored. Hence, although the
model is dynamic, given the fixity of G-T the effect of changes in the
lb
2. If lb > 1-b., then AMS = b Y+-(AG-AT), and
ib° 1 0 1-b i
AGD = -b
Q
Y-| y— “1 | (AG-AT) <O. Here, the decrease in GD is greater
than in the case above.
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Figure 3-23
Model A-5, Case 1, Interest Rate Policy:
Different Possible Effects of a Change
In (G-T) on Government Debt.
Figure 3-24
Model A=s, Case 1, Interest Rate Policy:
Money Supply Government Debt Trade Off
and the Implicit Social Indifference Map
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Figure 3-25
Model A-5. Effect of a Demand for Money Shock
On Income Under an Interest Rate Policy
Case A(NW + MS + GD + K)
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money supply is offset by opposite changes in government debt. In
other words,
2. Policy Procedure: Money Supply Instrument
Determination of Instrument Value
*
Given Y = Y
, the instrument value for the money supply is
obtained as before yielding the following result:
Implications of the Procedure
The effect of using money as the instrument is that it makes
interest rates endogenous and, hence, affected by economic shocks. The
reduced form is:
We can see that the higher the income elasticity of the demand for
money (b ) relative to the marginal propensity to save, the lower the
effect of money demand shocks relative to the effect of real sector
shocks on interest rates. Hence, in an economy in which increases in














c'b .cAc (1-b. ) [(1 ~ b l >MS*-b (a +a )+b (I+b )T~
101 o o 1
Gb (1 +l)-b IMS*-b IGD, -b IK-b (U +U.)-(1-bi )U .]o o o t-1 o o c i 1 md
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proportionally greater than the increases in savings((l-b^)AY), and in
which the money supply is used as the monetary policy instrument,
shocks in the real sector will cause greater interest rate changes than
monetary shocks, given a money supply instrument.
On the other hand, under the present policy procedure, since
#
the money supply is held constant (MS ) then AMS = 0, with the
implication that government debt becomes exogenous, depending only upon
changes in the deficit. This result is obtained from:
Then if AMS = 0, G-T = AGD, which implies that government deficits are
solely financed by government debt expansions. Let us now obtain the
magnitude of the effects of government deficits on interest rates as
well as in government debt. Assuming a change in both G and T, the
effects are the following:
Where v#= —:— -r.—r—r < 0.
c b +c.b +c (1-b.)
101 o o 1
The above expression for Ar can also be expressed as follows:
We can also see that the interest rate reduced form includes
GD
y
which is closely related to government deficits. Let us recall
that:
G = T+AMS+AGD
Ar = —r— rr~ 7,~ — ->■ ( b (I+b. )AT-b (1 +I) AG) .
c f .b +c,b +c (1-b,) o 1 o
101 o o






since GD and MS, . are the GD and MS levels for some past
t-n-i t-n-1 K
initial period and are thus constant. Then, since under a money supply
instrument procedure = 0, we have:
which indicates that a deficit in the present will affect future
interest rates and not only current ones.
Reduced Form of Income
As the following formula shows, both IS and LM disturbances
affect income.
From this equation, it is shown that the greater the interest
sensitivity of the demand for money ( and hence the greater the LM
slope the greater the effect of real sector’s shocks on income. On
the other hand, the larger the interest elasticity of Investment and
GD = GD,. , +MS, 1 -MS. ,+KG. .-T. .)t~l t-n-1 t-n-1 t~l t-i t-i
Hence: AGD
t_ 1





































I +a.-)~c(l + b I )Tb
o (cj+c^) + co ( 1 ~b^) 1 1 o o 1 2 o 1
+ c (I+l)G+c IGD. + c lK+c U. +c U -(cl+cjU .].




and cj respectively), the larger the effect of money
7 fi
demand shocks on income.
Finally, the effects of an increase in the deficit are given
by:
where v<o.
The effect of the deficit on income depends upon the
coefficients c
q
and 1, plus those included in v. Hence, the interest
sensitivity of the demand for money plays a very important role.
The effects of a deficit on future income changes are given by
AY = v(c 1 ) AGD.
t+l o t
where: = G t~ Tf
Table 3-11 summarizes the effects of a deficit increase under
#
the MS policy, on interest rates, income and government deficit.
1
.
Policy Procedure :Interest Rate Instrument
78. See Appendix for a proof of both statements.
AY = v(-c (I+b, )AT +c ( I+I )AG, )tOI t o t
or: AY = v(c ( AG -b. AT )+c I(AG -AT. ))
o t 1 t o t t












































































































































































































































































Determination of the instrument value
Under the assumption that net worth is defined as the sum of
money supply and capital stock only, the first consequence is a
different IS than that in Case 1
As the equation shows, the money supply appears in the IS implying that
*
the value of the instrument r cannot be determined, as before, solely
*
by the IS for a given Y . It is now necessary to include the monetary
80 *
sector. The resulting formula to determine the value of r is:
Implications of the Procedure
As before, the interest rate policy procedure implies that the
money supply becomes endogenous. Such endogeneity of MS has different
consequences than in previous cases and models since now it is also
part of the real sector(i.e., IS). Its reduced form is the following:
79. For derivations see Appendix.
80. For the new derivations see Appendix
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where we assume (b
Ql)<(1-b^) for a stable system.
In the formula, the coefficient - -
1
accounts for the effect of
I_br bo
l
money supply increases on consumption and back on money supply due to
~
*
the policy of keeping r at r .
Reduced form of Income
The reduced form equation is:
As this equation shows, even under an interest rate policy
monetary sector shocks will cause income to deviate from target. A
comparative statics illustration seems adequate at this point in order
to capture the elements involved under the present analysis. Suppose
U
md
>o(money demand shock); both the demand for money and the LM shift,
as shown in figure 3“26, to and respectively . Since the
*
interest rate rises above r
,
the money supply increases to restore it,
#
and hence income Y is restored(LM goes back to in the figure).
However, since the money supply has increased, net worth has increased
and so has consumption, causing the IS to shift rightwards to The
result is a higher income that further causes money demand to expand,
causing interest rates to rise, too. Money supply expansion will again
*
result in bringing interest rates back to r . Thus, moves to and
*
to in the figure, leading to a level of income above target Y .
Since the money supply has risen again, consumption will rise too, and






Model A-5. Effects of an LM Shock under
an Interest Rate Policy
Case 2 (NW + MS + K).
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81
this process will continue until a new equilibrium is attained.
Finally, it is interesting to compare cases 1 and 2 under the
interest rate policy, given that the only difference between them is
the definition of net worth.
In case 1, LM shocks do not affect equilibrium income, while
they do in case 2. In addition, in case 2 the multiplier of IS shocks
is greater than that of case 1. While in case 1 such effect is given
1 1
by the coefficient -——, in case 2 it is given by -r—-—r-r which is
1-b.




I is positive but less than 1-b^.
On the other hand, past government deficits, as well as
increasing government deficits, affect present income under case 1,
while only increasing deficits affect income under case 2. A very
simple numerical example is given in Table 3~12.
The effects of government budget changes (i.e., AG and AT)
under the present circumstances (case 2, interest rate policy) are
worth looking at and comparing them to those obtained under case 1
above. First of all, the reduced form for GD
f
becomes:
where MS is the reduced form equation for the money supply (see
above). Hence, all factors affecting the money supply will affect
81. Equilibrium is attained under the assumption that




























































































government debt in the opposite direction, as long as G , T , and
remain constant.
Table 3~13 shows the effects of changes in G and Ton the key
endogenous variables MS, Y and GD. In this case (case 2), an increase
in the deficit does not affect the net worth until the money supply has
been increased as a result of the deficit increase; in contrast, in
case 1 the deficit affects net worth immediately through a change in
government debt, which in such case is assumed to be included in the

















































































































In case 2, such money supply expansion has feed-back effects in
the goods market since as it increases, the value of wealth has
increased (here, NW = MS+K), while in case 1 it does not or does very
slightly, since NW is defined as NW = MS+K+GD, and the increased MS is
Op
offset by decreased GD under this latter case.
Therefore, since the income multiplier is greater in case 2
than in case 1 provided AG = AT, the change in money supply (which
equals b
Q
Y) is greater under case 2 and hence the change in government
debt is not as large, 2 but if AG is greater than AT, it is not
possible to generalize and state that the change in money supply is
greater under case 2.
Finally, we must mention that the relative values of b 1 and
play an important but different role under either case 1 or 2. In
case 1, they determine the way in which increased deficits are financed
(i.e., the distribution between money supply and government debt); in
case 2, they determine the possibility for the system to attain a
84
stable equilibrium after G-T has increased : if b 1 is greater than
82. See the different cases for b
Q 1/[l—b^) in last part of
case 1.
83. This has been proven for case AG = AT in general, and for
the case AG>AT with a numerical example since the general proof is more
difficult in this latter case. See technical appendix at end of
chapter.
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or equal to 1-b
, the deficit will cause continuous and increased
changes in the money supply and on income (each increase is larger than
the previous one). Hence, there is no stable equilibrium for these
endogenous variables. (See Table 3-14.)
2. Policy Procedure:Money Supply Instrument
Determination of the Instrument Value
This is determined by estimating the interest rate (r) from
the IS and substituting its value into the LM. The result is:
Implications of this Procedure
The reduced form of the interest rate that becomes the
endogenous,clearing variable under the present policy is:
If we compare this reduced form with that in case 1, there are
only slight differences, such as with respect to the effect of a change
in G and T on the value of r. Here, government debt affects interest
84. In this case 2, they determine the stability condition for
any exogenous variable appearing in the reduced form for income
M = —r-[(c (1-b +b )Y +c b.T- c G-c a -c a -c IK]











































































rates only through G and T but not through consumption as in case 1.
However, the effect of disturbances is the same in both cases.
Reduced Form of Income
It is given by:
Again, the only differnce with case 1 lies in the effect of
changes in G and T on income, and this is due only to the definition of
Net Worth.
In this case, only current budget conditions affect income, and
not past period ones as happened in case 1 above. Furthermore, even
the effect of current budget is different here than it was in case 1;
under case 2 this effects are:
while under case 1 it was:
These expressions show that a balanced budget (AG = AT) has the
same impact on current income under either case; but an unbalanced
budget which would include the increasing deficit situation (i.e.,
AG>AT) will have a greater impact on current income under easel than
Y
(o l'+o 1 )bo+co (1-bl ) [<C i
+0
1
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A final wrap-up from Model A~5 would be that, under case 1
only, past deficits affect current income and the monetary variables
that become endogenous given the monetary policy procedure being
followed.
On the other hand, under either case 1 or 2, an unbalanced or a
balanced budget will affect current income but this effect will be
stronger under an interest rate policy than under a money supply
policy. (See Table 3~15) However, if the interest rate policy is
followed, such effect on current income is stronger under case 2 than
under case 1, given that AG = AT. While if a money supply policy is
followed, the effect on Y is the same under both case.if AG = AT and
stronger in case 1 if AG>AT. See Table 3—16.
With respect to the effect on the monetary variable that
becomes endogenous under the policy under effect, we cannot
definitively state under which policy the budget conditions will have a
greater effect. All we can state in this respect is that under an
interest rate policy the effects on the money supply will be larger in
case 2 if AG = AT, while if AG>AT, the conclusion is uncertain,
depending on the value of the parameters involved in the multiplier and
in the magnitude of the respective AG and AT. See Table 3~17.
Under a money supply policy the effects on interest rates are





































































































































II. ANALYTICAL SIMULATION OF SHOCKS
A. Summary of Results: Models A-1 to A-5
In this section we proceed to give an overall summary of the results
obtained under each economic structure and under each monetary policy
procedure. Table 3“18 presents such results, showing for each of the
specified models, and for each policy procedure, the reduced form
equation for income and for the resulting endogenous monetary variable.
As we can see, whenever the interest rate policy is followed,
the money supply becomes the endogenous monetary variable and therefore
its reduced form equation is shown. On the contrary, when a money
supply policy is implemented it is the interest rate that becomes
endogenous and hence its reduced form equation becomes the one of
interest.
On the other hand, in Model A-2 under the money supply policy
we find two cases: one in which the instrument is money supply itself
and the other where the the instrument is another monetary aggregate
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Under the latter approach both interest rates and the money supply will
be endogenous and therefore both of their reduced form equations are
shown.
Model A~3, where investment has been transformed into an
interest inelastic function, turns out to be a case in which monetary
*
policy cannot be directed towards attaining Y .
Model A~4, with the introduction of price expectations, allows
for the possibility of dynamic effects. Therefore, when analyzing the
sensitivity of the endogenous variables to different shocks, we will
also need to refer to the dynamic multipliers. The price expectation
mechanism, for which two different assumptions were considered, is the
key element in the determination of these dynamic effects. On the
other hand, the "revision” and "non revision" cases lead to different
results with respect to these dynamic effects depending upon the policy
procedure and the price expectations mechanism assumed.
Finally Model A-5 considers the wealth effect in Consumption,
and our analysis shows how society’s attitude with respect to
government debt (i.e..whether the debt is viewed as an asset or as a
deferred liability) will render different implications with respect to
the effect of shocks in the economy under alternative monetary
policies, and also with respect to the effect of increasing deficits
under alternative policies.
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B. Effect of Each Type of Shock, Same Procedure but Different Models.
1
• Interest Rate Policy
Interest Rate Policy: Effect of Shocks on Income
A general finding is that in models A-1, A-2 and A~3, under an
interest rate policy, only real sector's shocks can cause deviations of
income from target.
Then we have model A-4 which shows that under an interest rate
target, income would be affected by real sector’s shocks but also by
changes in price expectations. Two cases are considered: case A, that
assumes that price expectations are a function of past income growth,
and case B, where price expectations depend upon past money growth.
For both of these cases we introduce the possibilities that in the
short run (period j) monetary authorities either revise or not their
estimation of public’s expectations. If they do revise and their
revision coincides with the true price expectations the change in price
expectations, has no effect in income since the authorities have
*
revised r to be consistent with the new price expectations in
achieving the target income. On the other hand, if their revised price
expectations do not coincide with the true ones, there will be a
deviation of Income from target, but this deviation will be random.
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Finally, when there is no revision process in the short run, if
there is a change in price expectations, income will deviate from
target, but this deviation will not be random but will depend upon the
price expectation formation mechanism. In case A it will depend upon
past income changes, which are affected by past real sector's shocks.
In case B, it depends upon past money supply changes which are affected
by past shocks in the real and monetary sectors, as becomes evident
from the money supply reduced form equation.
Therefore, under an interest rate policy procedure we have a
situation in which both real and monetary shocks will cause income to
deviate from target: current income is affected by current real sector
shocks and by past monetary sector shocks through the price
expectations variable. This will become clearer and more specific in
the next section where we obtain the impact and dynamic multipliers for
each type of shock, under each model and each policy procedure.
We then have model A-5, where the wealth effect in consumption
has been introduced. Here we also studied two alternative cases, which
differ only with respect to the definition of the non-human wealth
variable that we called "net worth". In case 1, net worth was defined
as the sum of government debt, money supply and the capital stock,
while in case 2we excluded government debt from the definition. It
turns out that under case 1, when an interest rate policy is used only
real sector shocks affect income as is seen from its reduced form
equation. However, in case 2 we also find monetary shocks affecting
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income changes. This arises because a monetary shock, by causing money
supply to be accommodative, will affect the real sector by changing net
worth, which affects consumption, hence causing income to change (i.e.,
an LM shift causes an IS shift). Under case 1, the money supply also
changed but it caused government debt to change in the opposite way
leaving the value of net worth unchanged as a result of the monetary
shocks.
In sum we have two situations in which, under an interest rate
policy, both the real and monetary shocks will cause equilibrium income
to change and hence to deviate from target if the economy starts at
such target level. They are:
1. When investment is affected by price expectations, these being
determined by past monetary growth, and assuming monetary
authorities do not revise their estimates of society's price
expectations in the short run, but only whey they set the
instrument value every long run period.
2. When the consumption function is affected by non-human wealth
or net worth, the latter defined as money supply plus stock of
capital only; that is, government debt is not viewed by
society as part of their net worth.
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Interest Rate Policy: Effects of Shocks on Money Supply.
Now, since the money supply is the endogenous monetary variable
under an interest rate policy, we proceed to analyze its reduced form
equation under the alternative models we have.
Table 3~18 shows that both real and monetary shocks will cause
the money supply to change under all of the models studied. It is also
a general result that the greater the income sensitivity of the demand
for money (i.e., b
Q
), the greater will be the effects of real sector’s
shocks on the money supply. On the other hand, the marginal propensity
to consume (hereinafter MPC) also plays a role under all models where
the effects of real sector shocks on the money supply will be greater
the higher the MPC is. However we must note that under model A-4, in
the no-revision cases real sector shocks affect money supply both
directly and indirectly through the price expectation variable; this
leads to the result that both current and past real sector shocks
affect current changes in the money supply (See multipliers of the
different shocks in Table 3—19).
Finally, under model A-5 case 2, the effect of these shocks on
money supply is larger due to the larger multiplier that results
because the money supply affects consumption through net worth.
We can conclude that the effect of real sector shocks on the
money supply are greater under these circumstances:
1. An economy where investment depends upon price expectations,
which are themselves dependent upon past money growth rates or




















































































































2. An economy where consumption is affected by the non-human
wealth component defined by the money supply and the stock of
capital.
Monetary sector shocks are also present in the money supply
reduced form equation under all models. In models A-1, A-2, A-3 and
A-4 case A, their role is exactly the same: a one to one
correspondence between the shock and the money supply change (i.e., the
impact multiplier equals 1). However, under model A-4 with the
assumption that price expectations are determined by past money growth
and that there is no revision, current money supply will change due to
both current and past monetary shocks, with the latter affecting the
money supply through changes in price expectations.
Finally, under model A-5, when net worth is defined as money
supply plus the capital stock (case 2), the effect of monetary shocks
on the money supply is greater than under the case in which net worth
has been defined differently (case 1), a result that is due to the
different roles played by the money supply in the real sector when the
definition of net worth is changed. In sum, if an interest rate policy
is pursued, monetary shocks will cause greater money supply variability
under economic structures that have these characteristics:
1. Investment is affected by price expectations which themselves
depend upon past money growth, and the monetary authorities do
not revise their price expectations estimates in the short
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run
2. Net worth, which is part of the public’s wealth concept, does
not include government debt considerations. That is,
government debt is viewed as future burden on the tax system,
or postponement of tax payments rather that current wealth,
and therefore is not included in the public’s wealth variable.
2. Money Supply Policy
Money Supply Policy:Effects of Shocks on Income.
Under a money supply policy, as Table 3~18 shows, the reduced
form of income includes both real and monetary shocks in models A-1,
A-2, A-4 and A-5. Under model A~3, given the non-sensitivity of
investment to interest rates, income is determined solely by the real
sector and therefore only real sector shocks can cause income to
change. Then if we analyze each type of shock individually we observe
that under model A~3 the effect of real sector shocks on income is
given by the full real sector’s multiplier (i.e., - ).
D 1
We can see that the effect under model A-4 is greater than
under A-1 and A-2, due to the effect of price expectations. Finally,
under model A-5 the effect of real sector shocks on income is smaller










































































spending as compared to before). (See Table 3“19).
With respect to monetary shocks we see in Table 3-20 that their
effect on income is the same under A-1 and A-2, and greater in model
A-s(due to c’).^
Comparing models A-1 and A-2 with model A-4 it is obvious that
the multiplier is lower in the latter due to the element ”1 + Pe" in
the denominator. However, under case A current income will also be
affected by past monetary shocks and hence we would have a dynamic
multiplier greater than the impact multiplier. We will see this in a
section below.
Under the money supply policy it is possible to rank each model
according to the degree of sensitivity of income to monetary and real
sector shocks (impact multipliers); ranking them from the one in which
there is less sensitivity to the one with greater sensitivity we
obtain:
Monetary Shocks
A-3, A~4, A-1 and A-2, A-5.
Real Sector Shocks
A~5, A-1 and A-2, A-4, A-3
85. See proof in Appendix.
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As a conclusion it seems that under a money supply policy
monetary shocks have no effect under a structure where investment (and
consumption) is insensitive to interest rates. Then, among the rest of
the structures under analysis, the lowest impact is found in the case
in which investment is affected by price expectations, although the
dynamic effect under case A is greater than the effect of such impact.
The largest impact of monetary shocks on income is under model A-5 and
this is due to the larger interest-sensitivity of the real sector. On
the other hand, under model A-5, real sector shocks have the smallest
effect on Y, while under model A~3 these effects are maximized.
Finally, comparing Tables 3~19 and 3“20 we conclude that, with the
exception of model A~3, if the interest sensitivity of spending in the
real sector is larger than the interest sensitivity of the demand for
money, the effects of monetary sector shocks on income will be greater
than the effects of real sector shocks, under a money supply policy.
Also, the larger the (positive) price expectations, the greater the
effects of real sector shocks and the lower the effects of monetary
shocks on income.
Money supply Policy: Effect of Shocks on Interest Rates.
We now proceed to compare the effects of different shocks on
interest rates under the money supply policy. From Tables 3—21 and
3-22, it is evident that interest rates are affected by both real
sector and monetary sector shocks.
Table
3~21.
Model
Summary:
Impact
and
Dynamic
Effects
of
Monetary
Sector
Shocks
on
Interest
Rates
under
a
Money
Supply
Policy
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Table
3~22.
Model
Summary:
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